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Allocation of Loss Due to Fraudulent Wholesale Wire
Transfers: Is There a Negligence Action Against a
Beneficiary's Bank After Article 4A of the Uniform
Commercial Code?
Robert M. Lewis
INTRODUCTION

Every day in the United States, wholesale wire transfers send over
one trillion dollars between banks, 1 and on busier days the value approaches twice that amount. 2 The importance of wire transfers will
grow tremendously as electronic banking eclipses paper mechanisms. 3
Until 1989, however, no comprehensive body of law existed to govern
the rights and obligations of the parties to a wire transfer. The drafters of Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or "the Code") article 4A
meant to solve that problem and dispel the uncertainty regarding liability for unauthorized wire transfers.4 However, article 4A inadequately determines liability in cases where a bank negligently honors a
fraudulent wire transfer. 5
1. U.C.C. art. 4A Prefatory Note (1991) (all references in this Note are to the 1991 version of
the UCC, including the amendments to articles 3 and 4). Wholesale wire transfers, a subset of
the larger group of transactions known as electronic funds transfers (EFTs), move funds electronically between two entities. Wholesale transfers are nonconsumer transfers, usually involving
large amounts of money, which occur primarily between corporations and banks, see U.C.C.
§ 4A-104 cmt. 2, as opposed to consumer transactions such as point-of-sale debit and automatedteller-machine (ATM) transactions. U.C.C. art. 4A Prefatory Note. The Electronic Funds
Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. § 1693(a)-(r) (1988), governs most aspects of consumer EFTs
and article 4A's coverage excludes any transaction covered by EFTA. U.C.C. § 4A-108.
2. Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Intl., 570 N.E.2d 189, 194 (N.Y. 1991).
3. Michael I. Spak, The Case to Be Made for Proposed Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial
Code: What's a Trillion Dollars Between Friends?/, 80 KY. L.J. 167, 168 (1991). From 1980 to
1984 the number of wire transfers handled by the two main U.S. transfer networks, Fedwire and
Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), rose almost 50%. Oliver Wulff, Two Ways

to Achieve the Same Goal: The Model Law on International Credit Transfers and the New U. C. C.
Article 4A in the National and International Contexts, 9 Wis. INTL. L. REv. 69, 70 n.5 (1990).
4. See Discussion of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 4A - Funds Transfers, in 66 A.L.I.
PROC. 400 (1989) (remarks of Professor Jordan) [hereinafter A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS]; see also
Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 731 F. Supp. 57, 62 (D. Mass.
1990). Article 4A governsfunds transfers, of which a wire transfer is but one type. U.C.C. art.
4A Prefatory Note. This Note uses wire transfer and EFT interchangeably and is concerned
mainly with electronic transfers, as they are the most common. The position of this Note, however, should also apply to any other sort of article 4A funds transfer. In this Note, article 4A is
referred to as both 4A and article 4A.
5. For analyses that do not discuss a paying bank's negligence, see Scott D. Benner, Commercial Law: Loss Allocation Under U.C.C. Article 4A, 1990 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 239 (1991); Tony
M. Davis, Comparing Article 4A with Existing Case Law on Funds Transfers: A Series of Case
Studies, 42 ALA. L. REv. 823 (1991) (arguing that article 4A would sufficiently resolve several
pre-4A cases); Spak, supra note 3, at 200-13 (discussing 4A loss-allocation without mention of
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Most transactions should occur smoothly with the new article, but
difficulty arises when a bank which eventually pays a fraudulent wire
transfer should reasonably have suspected misconduct. In determining loss allocation in these cases, article 4A is confused. Depending on
the court's interpretation, 4A either leaves liability uncertain or compels an innocent party to pay. Courts confronting these cases will look
to the new Code provisions, 6 but 4A provides neither certain nor acceptable results. Resolution, however, may be no farther away than
the common law.
This Note argues that where a bank reasonably should have known
of a fraud but still pays out a wire transfer to an unauthorized recipient, common law negligence should provide a basis for recovery despite the absence of an explicit Code provision imposing liability on
the bank. Part I examines the UCC's language itself and analyzes possible cases, under 4A and under articles 3 and 4 by analogy, and discusses the applicability of these other parts of the UCC to wire
transfers. Part II examines how extra-Code regulatory systems and
the common law would determine wire transfer liability. Part II then
discusses how article 4A incorporates banking regulations apart from
its provisions and whether 4A displaced the common law negligence
action which existed prior to the new article or UCC section 1-103
incorporates it. Part III analyzes explicit and implicit UCC policies,
both in general and with respect to wire transfers in particular. Finally, this Part evaluates negligence in light of these policies and considers whether holding the negligent bank liable will promote a more
efficient wire transfer system from a societal perspective. This Note
concludes that article 4A should not displace negligence as a cause of
action, because a negligence claim will prevent inequity and promote
efficiency without unduly frustrating Code policies.

I.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE CODE

Before the enactment of article 4A, courts looked to several
sources of law to resolve liability for wire transfer loss. Some considered other Code provisions; others relied upon the common law. 7 Article 4A introduces yet another allocative scheme. Article 4A's
beneficiary's bank's potential negligence); Katherine Esposito, Note, What Regulates Corporate
Electronic Funds Transfers?, 13 SETON HALL LEGJS. J. 75, 99-100 (1989) (same); Tina E.
McKelvy, Note, Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code: Finally, Banks and Their Customers Know Where They Stand and Who Pays When a Wire Transfer Goes Awry, 21 MEM. ST. U. L.
351 (1991) (same).
6. As of November 15, 1991, 32 states (including New York, Illinois, California, and Ohio)
had adopted article 4A, and it "appears well on the way to universal enactment by the end of
1993." Fred H. Miller, The U.C.C. Today: Revisions, Planned Revisions, and State Enactments,
u.c.c. BULL., Jan. 1992, at 1, 2-3.
7. This Note discusses other UCC sections infra section I.B.2 and courts' use of the common
law infra sections 11.A.1 and 11.B.1.
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mandates, however, raise doubts about its efficacy. This Part examines the language of the UCC and its operation in certain fraudulent
wire transfer cases and concludes that article 4A fails to provide a
sensible solution. But an analogy to articles 3 and 4, this Part argues,
suggests a more reasonable treatment of the problem. Section I.A applies 4A's provisions to several hypothetical fraud cases and concludes
that under its language an innocent account holder or bank will probably bear the loss even if the fraud is detected. In these cases, however,
the article's rationales would not support placing liability on these innocent parties. Additionally, conflict within the Code and with other
apposite law weakens 4A's reliability. Section I.B.l explores the principles of negligence governing a bank's handling of wire transfers, and
section I.B.2 examines analogous situations under other UCC articles.
These related Code rules likely would place the loss on the least-cost
risk-avoider, usually the party who dealt directly with the thief. Section I.B maintains that both UCC liability provisions in analogous situations and article 4A's partial acceptance of negligence principles
support the use of negligence law in wire transfer cases. This Part
concludes that the language of the Code might encompass a negligence
action against the paying bank, but resort to extra-Code law would
provide a more coherent solution.

A. Article 4A 's ''Solutions"
The simplest interbank wholesale wire transfer involves four parties. The customer sending the wire transfer, usually a corporation, is
the originator. 8 The originator gives a payment order to the receiving
or originator's bank where it has an account;9 the receiving-originator's bank then relays its own payment order to the beneficiary's bank,
instructing payment to the recipient or beneficiary of the wire transfer,
probably through a deposit in an account. 10 Usually the beneficiary is
an intended recipient of the money, but occasionally a transfer goes
awry or is not authorized by the account holder in the first place. 11
Article 4A is flawed, however, in its treatment of transfers involving a
beneficiary's bank that fails to exercise reasonable care. Consider two
cases: one involving a suspicious beneficiary and one effectuated by
confusing the beneficiary's name and account number.
8. U.C.C. § 4A-104(c).
9. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(4).
10. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(2)-(3). For a more detailed explanation of the mechanics ofa funds
transfer, see, e.g., Benner, supra note 5, at 242-44; Spak, supra note 3, at 172-79; McKelvy, supra
note 5, at 354-58.
11. Article 4A provides elaborate rules for loss allocation and recovery of erroneously executed wire transfers, see, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 4A-205 (overpayment, duplicate payment or incorrect
beneficiary), 4A-303 (execution error), 4A-305 (failure to complete or late execution of payment
order), but this Note refers to those rules only when relevant to liability for unauthorized, i.e.,
fraudulent, wire transfers.
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1. The Suspicious Beneficiary
A large depositor, such as a corporation or national treasury,
maintains accounts in banks across the world. A sophisticated criminal operation somehow cracks the security code that the customer and
its banker use, 12 thereby gaining access to the billion-dollar account.
Once inside the system, the thief causes a funds transfer to be executed
electronically to another bank. Shortly afterwards several individuals
arrive at the transferee-beneficiary's bank to collect the transfer. The
bank likely balks at gathering several million dollars in cash on a few
minutes' notice, but it does nonetheless. Seemingly oblivious to the
several men scanning the bank's lobby with hands in coats, or to some
other equally suspicious facts, the bank hands over the money to the
false beneficiary without seeking identification or confirmation from
either the transferring originator's bank or the individual claiming the
cash. The thieves disappear. The supposed originator, the victim of
the fraud, notices nothing until its checks start to bounce because the
transaction satisfied the bank's security procedures.
Perhaps the bank refuses to release the funds, and instead sends
the payment order to another bank, which does comply. To one bank
the transfer fee may justify the risk of mistaken payment, while others
may proceed more cautiously. 13 Multiple transfers would illuminate
the relative unreasonableness of the eventual paying bank's behavior.
If several banks refuse to pay and then one does comply, the paying
bank may have deviated sufficiently from the norm to have acted negligently. Beyond this hot-potato situation, myriad circumstances may
arguably put a beneficiary's bank on notice of suspicious circumstances and impose a duty to act reasonably to prevent the loss or to
avoid facilitating it. To illustrate potential negligence claims, this
Note will proceed to discuss other situations. The Note does not assume that any one of the fact scenarios presented necessarily constitutes negligence; it will not discuss negligence law in detail. This Note
merely argues that situations such as these justify allowing a negligence action to proceed. This first example arguably presents the most
obvious case, but in any given situation, a jury or court would make
the ultimate negligence determination.
Article 4A will likely deny recovery in this first example, if the
originator's bank or its customer, the nominal originator, seeks compensation. At first glance, 4A apparently places the loss on the innocent originator or originator's bank. 14 Because the thieves appeared to
12. See BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE§ 1.3 (1991) ("[L]ines
can be tapped, and criminals can break into systems.").
13. In normal circumstances, a chain of several transfers may be needed to effectuate a complex or distant transfer. See U.C.C. art. 4A Prefatory Note.
14. Part 2 of article 4A deals with unauthorized payment orders:
§ 4A-201. Security Procedure.
"Security procedure" means a procedure established by agreement of a customer and a
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meet the originator's bank's breached security procedure, assuming
that the procedure was commercially reasonable and the transfer
receiving bank [which receives the erroneous order from the thief] for the purpose of (i)
verifying that a payment order or communication amending or cancelling a payment order
is that of the customer, or (ii) detecting error in the transmission or the content of the
payment order or communication. A security procedure may require the use of algorithms
or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, callback procedures, or similar
security devices. Comparison of a signature on a payment order or communication with an
authorized specimen signature of the customer is not by itself a security procedure.
The Official Comment adds:
The question of whether loss that may result from the transmission of a spurious or
erroneous payment order will be borne by the receiving bank or the sender or purported
sender is affected by whether a security procedure was or was not in effect and whether there
was or was not compliance with the procedure.

§ 4A-202. Authorized and Verified Payment Orders.
(a) A payment order received by the receiving bank is the authorized order of the
person identified as the sender if that person authorized the order or is otherwise bound by it
under the law of agency.
(b) If a bank and its customer have agreed that the authenticity of payment orders
issued to the bank in the name of the customer as sender will be verified pursuant to a
security procedure, a payment order received by the receiving bank is effective as the order
of the customer, whether or not authorized, if (i) the security procedure is a commercially
reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized payment orders, and (ii) the
bank proves that it accepted the payment order in good faith and in compliance with the
security procedure and any written agreement or instruction of the customer restricting
acceptance of payment orders issued in the name of the customer. The bank is not required
to follow an instruction that violates a written agreement with the customer or notice of
which is not received at a time and in a manner affording the bank a reasonable opportunity
to act on it before the payment order is accepted.
(c) Commercial reasonableness of a security procedure is a question of law to be determined by considering the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of
the customer known to the bank, including the size, type, and frequency of payment orders
normally issued by the customer to the bank, alternative security procedures offered to the
customer, and security procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks similarly
situated. A security procedure is deemed to be commercially reasonable if (i) the security
procedure was chosen by the customer after the bank offered, and the customer refused, a
security procedure that was commercially reasonable for that customer, and (ii) the customer expressly agreed in writing to be bound by any payment order, whether or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank in compliance with the security procedure
chosen by the customer.
(d) The term "sender" in this Article includes the customer in whose name a payment
order is issued ifthe order is the authorized order of the customer under subsection (a), or it
is effective as the order of the customer under subsection (b).
(e) This section applies to amendments and cancellations of payment orders to the
same extent it applies to payment orders.
(t) Except as provided in this section and in Section 4A-203(a)(l), rights and obligations arising under this section or Section 4A-203 may not be varied by agreement.
§ 4A-203. Unenforceability of Certain Verified Payment Orders.
(a) If an accepted payment order is not, under Section 4A-202(a), an authorized order
of a customer identified as sender, but is effective as an order of the customer pursuant to
Section 4A-202(b), the following rules apply:
(1) By express written agreement, the receiving bank may limit the extent to
which it is entitled to enforce or retain payment of the payment order.
(2) The receiving bank is not entitled to enforce or retain payment of the payment
order if the customer proves that the order was not caused, directly or indirectly, by a
person (i) entrusted at any time with duties to act for the customer with respect to payment
orders or the security procedure, or (ii) who obtained access to transmitting facilities of the
customer or who obtained, from a source controlled by the customer and without authority
of the receiving bank, information facilitating breach of the security procedure, regardless of
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processed in good faith by the bank, 15 the customer would be liable for
the theft under section 4A-202. Section 4A-203 provides the only apparent escape for the customer: she must prove that the thieves gained
access to the security code from a source outside her control. 16 Even if
the customer could prove this negative - probably an impossible burden given the organization's size17 - section 4A-203 holds the innocent originator's bank liable 18 and ignores the bank which paid to the
nominal beneficiary under circumstances suggesting negligence.
A fraud that the beneficiary's bank could reasonably detect need
not be a single extraordinary transfer as in this first case. Transfers
over a period of time may build on each other's suspiciousness until
they suggest that a theft is occurring. Perhaps the beneficiary's bank
establishes an account for a new customer it knows or should know,
either as a matter of common knowledge or as a result of its own investigation, is involved in criminal operations or suffering financial difhow the information was obtained or whether the customer was at fault. Information includes any access device, computer software, or the like.
(b) This section applies to amendments of payment orders to the same extent it applies
to payment orders.
Comment 3 states:
Subsection (b) of Section 4A-202 is based on the assumption that losses due to fraudulent payment orders can best be avoided by the use of commercially reasonable security
procedures, and that the use of such procedures should be encouraged. The subsection is
designed to protect both the customer and the receiving bank.
. . . If a commercially reasonable security procedure is not made available to the customer, subsection (b) does not apply. The result is that subsection (a) applies and the bank
acts at its peril in accepting a payment order that may be unauthorized.
Comment 5 explains the customer's risk:
The effect of Section 4A-202(b) is to place the risk of loss on the customer if an unauthorized payment order is accepted by the receiving bank after verification by the bank in
compliance with a commercially reasonable security procedure. An exception to this result
is provided by Section 4A-203(a)(2). The customer may avoid the loss resulting from such a
payment order if the customer can prove that the fraud was not committed by a person
described in that subsection.
U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 & cmt., 4A-202, 4A-203 & cmts. 3, 5.
15. See U.C.C. § 4A-202; Thomas C. Baxter & Raj Bhala, The Interrelationship ofArticle 4A
with Other Law, 45 Bus. LAW. 1485, 1497 (1990) (describing security procedure requirement);
see also J. Kevin French, Unauthorized and Erroneous Payment Orders, 45 Bus. LAW. 1425,
1427 (1990) (same).
16. U.C.C. § 4A-203(a)(2).
17. Luc Thevenoz, Error and Fraud in Wholesale Funds Transfers: U.CC Article 4A and
the UNCITRAL Harmonization Process, 42 ALA. L. REV. 881, 904, 944 (1991) (given the complexity of computer banking systems, the burden of proof may present enormous problems in
wire cases); cf. French, supra note 15, at 1439 ("Depending on how the customer runs his shop(,]
•.. this negative burden might be very difficult to uphold.").
18. See French, supra note 15, at 1440 ("[A] bank is not completely protected from risk of
loss by complying with a commercially reasonable security procedure."). But cf. Tomme J. Fent,
Note, Commercial Law: Electronic Funds Transfers: How New U.CC Article 4A May Affect
Consumers, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 339, 354 (1990) ("Article 4A would have protected both the
consumer and the bank from loss by means of an easily established and maintained security
procedure."). At least one state, Tennessee, has "eased the burden" on banks by requiring more
proof of innocence by the account holder, see generally McKelvy, supra note 5, at 370, but such a
modification merely shifts the loss from one innocent party to another, not to the one most at
fault, the receiving bank.
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ficulty. Over the course of several weeks, this supposed beneficiary
receives multiple large transfers from another bank, strongly suggesting a money laundering 19 or skimming20 operation. In a comparable situation, a customer, possibly known as a credit risk, deposits and
draws increasingly larger checks backed by uncollected funds: the
classic check-kite.21 In either the kite or the multiple wire transfer
situation, the bank should suspect a fraud; but it can pay the wire
transfer with impunity under article 4A. 22 Yet under article 3, a bank
that seeks recovery on a check while suspecting a kite scheme is, at the
least, engaged in a highly questionable activity. 23
Article 4A absolves a beneficiary's bank's carelessness in another
situation: when the bank receives large transfers from a corporate account at another bank to the personal account of one of the corporation's officers. If a corporate officer or fiduciary deposits corporate
checks drawn to the depositary bank into her personal account, article
3 assumes the bank has notice of the breach of fiduciary duty. 24 Unlike an embezzlement by check, however, an electronic transaction
19. Laura M.L. Maroldy, Note, Recordkeeping and Reporting in An Attempt to Stop the
Money Laundering Cycle: Why Blanket Recording and Reporting of Wire and Electronic Funds
Transfers Is Not the Answer, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 863, 889 (1991) ("[A] high volume of
activity by a customer the bank knows little about [may indicate a money-laundering
operation].").
20. Cf U.C.C. § 3-406 cmt. 4 (where an embezzling customer opens a corporate account and
immediately deposits a large check payable to the same name, the depositary bank may bear
liability for failure to exercise ordinary care by honoring the check); Wymore State Bank v.
Johnson Intl. Co., 873 F.2d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 1989) (summary judgment inappropriate where
bank could have detected embezzlement because financial instability of depositor was reasonably
knowable by bank officer).
21. Kite refers to a situation where a bank customer deposits checks drawn on a distant bank
to cover his balance at the first bank. The customer then draws checks on the first bank and
deposits them to cover his account at the distant bank. By drawing ever-increasing checks between the banks, the customer is able to secure interest-free loans for the time the checks are
being collected. Because the customer's account at any one time reflects a credit balance, no
checks bounce. But funds are never collected, for the customer merely shifts paper entries back
and forth between the two (or more) banks. Before the kite collapses when a bank finally refuses
to honor a check, the check-kiter can defraud a third party by writing what appear to be good
checks in exchange for goods or services, and then disappear, leaving the third party and the
banks to fight over the loss.
22. Under article 4A, liability for an unauthorized transfer rests on the nominal sending
parties, the originator or originator's bank. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
23. Shifting the risk of loss from a kiting scheme with suspicion of the kite may prevent the
bank from recovering after erroneously paying on a check. See U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt. 3:
In some cases .•. it may not be clear whether a drawee bank should have a right of restitution. For example, a check-kiting scheme may involve a large number of checks drawn on a
number of different banks in which the drawer's credit balances are based on uncollected
funds represented by fraudulently drawn checks.
Id. A bank in a kiting scheme arguably also violates its duty of good faith if it seeks to dump the
bad checks on another bank. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
24. U.C.C. § 3-307(b)(4). But see Richards v. Platte Valley Bank, 866 F.2d 1576, 1578 (10th
Cir. 1989), where the court, in a case involving an escrow service officer who misappropriated
funds by wire transfer prior to the revisions of article 3 creating notice of the breach of fiduciary
duty, held that the bank must have actual knowledge for liability under Colorado law.
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may not indicate that a theft is occurring; a bank payment order may
not reveal the parties and thus the fraud as clearly as the face of a
check would. But knowledge of the beneficiary's identity and the recurring, large sums should alert a conscientious bank to this questionable situation. In the check cases, article 3 supposes that "the person
taking the check might have detected the fraud and thus have prevented the loss by the exercise of ordinary care[, and] ... it is reasonable that that person bear loss to the extent the failure contributed to
the loss." 25 Presumably a beneficiary's bank's employees will not
cease observing the circumstances surrounding wire transfers. Many
of these losses might be prevented if the beneficiary bank merely hesitated when reasonably in doubt when processing the information already before them. Information from the beneficiary's application or
banking history should be readily available as well.
Moreover, section 4A-201 notes a callback procedure as one possible security procedure. 26 Such a precaution apparently causes little
enough burden that it suffices for the relation between the originator
and its bank. A beneficiary's bank, likewise, could call its transferor
for confirmation. Large Canadian banks, for example, currently follow a procedure requiring the beneficiary's bank to check the order's
authenticity.27 Yet under 4A, the beneficiary's bank may release the
funds to the suspicious beneficiary without remorse or fear of liability. 28 In such cases, when 4A releases the negligent beneficiary's bank
it defies both common sense and the expectations for analogous situations involving commercial paper.
2. Name and Number Fraud
Article 4A also produces questionable results when another type of
theft is attempted. A thief poses as the originator or his agent and
orders a wire transfer from the originator's bank in compliance with
the bank's security procedure to a beneficiary-account holder at the
distant, beneficiary's bank. The payment order describes the beneficiary by name and provides an account number. The number, however,
does not match the name given. Instead, it indicates an account at the
beneficiary's bank which belongs either to the thief or his confederate
or to an innocent third party whom the thief has conned. 29 The draft25. U.C.C. § 3-404 cmt. 3.
26. See U.C.C. § 4A-201.
27. WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 2.5.
28. The lack of constraints on the beneficiary's bank is especially peculiar considering § 4A404. Under that section, a beneficiary's bank is protected from consequential damages for failure
to pay a properly payable funds transfer if the bank can prove it had "a reasonable doubt concerning the right of the beneficiary to payment." U.C.C. § 4A-404(a). Article 4A assumes,
therefore, that situations will arise when a beneficiary's bank would doubt the validity of a transaction and should not complete it.
29. In Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank- Houston, 790 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986), and
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ers of section 4A-207 considered this possibility. 30 Under 4A207(c)(2), the loss falls on the originator's bank unless it gave notice to
the account holder that banks executing a funds transfer would direct
payment to the beneficiary solely by number, in which case the account holder pays. If the bank conditions wire transfer service on the
signing of a release under 4A-207(c)(2), as a savvy and powerful bank
probably would, all but the most valued originators-account holders
would bear the loss.
Securities Fund Servs., Inc. v. American Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 542 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. ill.
1982), thieves directed the funds into the account of a third-party merchant from whom they had
agreed to purchase valuables. Once the bank told the merchant that the funds were in his account, he released the goods to the thieves who, naturally, declined to participate in the final
accounting.
30. See U.C.C. § 4A-207 cmt. 2. Section 4A-207 provides:
§ 4A-207. Misdescription of Beneficiary.
(a) Subject to subsection (b), if, in a payment order received by the beneficiary's bank,
the name, bank account number, or other identification of the beneficiary refers to a nonexistent or unidentifiable person or account, no person has rights as beneficiary of the order
and acceptance of the order cannot occur.
(b) If a payment order received by the beneficiary's bank identifies the beneficiary both
by name and by an identifying or bank account number and the name and number identify
different persons, the following rules apply:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), if the beneficiary's bank does
not know that the name and number refer to different persons, it may rely on the number as
the proper identification of the beneficiary of the order. The beneficiary's bank need not
determine whether the name and number refer to the same person.
(2) If the beneficiary's bank pays the person identified by name or knows that the
name and number identify different persons, no person has rights as beneficiary except the
person paid by the beneficiary's bank if that person was entitled to receive payment from the
originator of the funds transfer. If no person has rights as beneficiary, acceptance of the
order cannot occur.
(c) If (i) a payment order described in subsection (b) is accepted, (ii) the originator's
payment order described the beneficiary inconsistently by name and number, and (iii) the
beneficiary's bank pays the person identified by number as permitted by subsection (b)(l),
the following rules apply:
(1) If the originator is a bank, the originator is obliged to pay its order.
(2) If the originator is not a bank and proves that the person identified by number
was not entitled to receive payment from the originator, the originator is not obliged to pay
its order unless the originator's bank proves that the originator, before acceptance of the
originator's order, had notice that payment of a payment order issued by the originator
might be made by the beneficiary's bank on the basis of an identifying or bank account
number even if it identifies a person different from the named beneficiary. Proof of notice
may be made by any admissible evidence. The originator's bank satisfies the burden of proof
if it proves that the originator, before the payment order was accepted, signed a writing
stating the information to which the notice relates.
(d) In a case governed by subsection (b)(l), ifthe beneficiary's bank rightfully pays the
person identified by number and that person was not entitled to receive payment from the
originator, the amount paid may be recovered from that person to the extent allowed by the
law governing mistake and restitution as follows:
(1) If the originator is obliged to pay its payment order as stated in subsection (c),
the originator has the right to recover.
(2) If the originator is not a bank and is not obliged to pay its payment order, the
originator's bank has the right to recover.
The rationale of§ 4A-207 is that, if the beneficiary's bank must verify the match between name
and number, "the benefits of automated payment are lost." U.C.C. § 4A-207 cmt. 2; Spak, supra
note 3, at 211; cf. Fred H. Miller et al., Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections, and
Commercial Electronic Fund Transfers, 42 Bus. LAW. 1269, 1290-91 (1987) (article 4A meant to
facilitate speedy transactions despite possible name-number problems).
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Operation of section 4A-207, however, poses problems for several
reasons. First, as with the suspicious beneficiary cases described in
section I.A.1 of this Note, the beneficiary's bank could have prevented
the loss without seriously undercutting the benefits of automation. 31
The beneficiary's bank never bears liability under 4A-207. Yet the
bank possessed greater information than the originator's bank, which
had no direct contact with the parties involved in the fraud beyond the
initial message made in compliance with the security system. The beneficiary's bank dealt with the account holder-beneficiary and, more importantly, it alone could have known of the discrepancy between name
and number. For both privacy and logistical reasons, only the beneficiary's bank can check the payment order's accuracy.
A possible money laundering scheme illustrates a second problem
with section 4A-207. Suppose an individual deposits with the originator's bank funds that she wishes to launder at a distant beneficiary's
bank. 32 In collaboration with an account holder at the beneficiary's
bank, she then sends money by wire transfer to an account naming an
innocent third party as the beneficiary but providing the account
number of her coconspirator. On the face of the payment order, the
innocent party apparently receives the credit because of the name provided. The partner's account actually receives the funds, however, because under 4A-207 the number controls. The partner then
"cleanses" the funds when he withdraws them, either in "new" cash or
possibly as a cashier's check. 33
Under 4A-207, neither the dummy account fraud, which results in
an innocent customer paying for goods she never received, nor the
money laundering example poses a threat of liability for the beneficiary's bank. But banks should question large payments that appear to
enter, but do not actually reach, the innocent customer's account. 34
Reasonable vigilance, such as a simple periodic scan of the records or
even a computer program, 35 could reveal the discrepancies. Customers' privacy is not threatened, for revelation would occur only within
the beneficiary's bank, where the recipient's account is located. Surely
a bank may scan its own records; moreover, only the beneficiary's
bank has access to this information because of these very same privacy
concerns. A bank's obligation to examine a transfer should arise only
31. See Benner, supra note 5, at 253 n.104 (computer program to detect error would keep
cost tow); McKelvy, supra note 5, at 379 (beneficiary's bank could detect error at tittle additional
cost). But see U.C.C. § 4A-207 cmt. 2 (reliance on number meant to speed transaction); cf. 12
C.F.R. § 210.27 (1992) (Federal Reserve Bank may rely on number alone and "has no duty to
detect any ... inconsistency.").
32. See Maroldy, supra note 19, at 864 (wire transfer has become a common method of
money laundering).
33. Id. at 888-89 n.132.
34. Cf. id. at 889 (multiple transfers suggest money laundering).
35. See supra note 31.
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in certain cases, 36 such as those where a pattern appears or a hitherto
unknown customer receives the credits. These limits on the beneficiary's bank's duty should lessen the objection that examinations of
transactions will destroy the benefits of wire transfers, speed and low
cost. 37 The callback possibility discussed above38 also applies. Section
4A-207, however, helps a thief conceal a crime39 which reasonable
care may have revealed.
3.

Conflicting Standards and Inapplicable Rationales

Article 4A's flaws derive from more than just its counterintuitive
results in cases involving a negligent beneficiary's bank. Irrelevant rationales, potential internal contradiction, and conflict with other law
also raise questions about 4A's coherence. These faults indicate that
article 4A alone may not suffice in these cases.
Article 4A's rationales do not support its allocation of liability between the originator and the beneficiary's bank. 40 The security procedure provisions, sections 4A-201 to 4A-205, allocate liability between
only the presumed originator and its bank. They ignore the relationship between the originator's bank or the originator and the beneficiary's bank and so arguably should not apply where both the originator
and its bank are innocent, as in the hypothetical cases presented in
section I.A.1 of this Note. Also, section 4A-207's language more reasonably addresses the case where an authorized originator gives a payment order which the originator's bank subsequently confuses. The
provision hinges on whether or not the originator received notice that
payment may be made by number alone41 and thus on what dealings
the customer had with her bank. Article 4A attempts to place the loss
from name-number fraud on the party normally best able to prevent it,
36. See Maroldy, supra note 19, at 864-65 (proposing regulations requiring inquiry only
when a transaction meets a money laundering "profile"). A standard of due care would apply
the same principle to any potential fraud. Cf U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 4 (bank may meet duty of
ordinary care without visual examination of all checks).
37. Thus the fear that cross-checking all payment orders would exceed the cost of losses
prevented, see Thevenoz, supra note 17, at 902, subsides under the more selective ordinary care
duty. See Maroldy, supra note 19, at 889-90 (selective requirement balances efficiency against
loss-prevention). Prior to the enactment of article 4A, Chase Manhattan Bank consistently
double-checked wire transfers made to its accounts, see id. at 870 n.34, indicating that competent
wire transfer payment need not be blind.
38. See supra text accompanying note 26.
39. Federal law prohibits the transfer of funds within the United States with the intent to
conceal or with knowledge of the concealment of criminal proceeds. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1992).
40. Article 4A addresses the originator's duty to complete payment, see U.C.C. § 4A-202(b)(c), and the discharge of the obligation between the originator and the beneficiary, see U.C.C.
§ 4A-406(b), which is only relevant in authorized payment cases. In fraud cases, however, article 4A specifically provides only for an allocation between the originator and its bank without
regard to the beneficiary's bank's fault. See supra notes 14-18, 30 and accompanying text (4A
liability provisions).
41. See U.C.C. § 4A-207(c)(2).
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the customer. She knows the beneficiary, can secure the correct
number, 42 and will naturally seek to prevent theft. In these cases,
however, either no contact occurs between the originator's bank and
the bank's actual customer - as in the dummy account case - or
such contact will not decrease the risk of loss because the money laundering customer's scheme relies on the discrepancy between name and
number. Only the beneficiary's bank has both evidence of the fraud
and motivation to reveal it because the customer is either oblivious to
the fraud or is himself the wrongdoer. The notice provision itself will
be of little value in preventing loss, for banks will understandably shift
liability to all but the largest customers by contractually allocating a
loss from name-number fraud to them. In these cases involving a negligent beneficiary's bank, 4A's logic simply does not apply.
Inconsistency within the UCC itself similarly casts doubt on 4A's
reliability. In the name-number fraud cases under section 4A207(b)(2), if the beneficiary's bank knows of the variation between
name and number, "acceptance of the order cannot occur"43 and the
nominal originator need not pay the transfer. 44 If the beneficiary's
bank fails to accept that an unauthorized party is seeking payment
despite information sufficient to suggest that possibility, it will not
"know" of the fraud. 45 Not only will this protection encourage willful
indifference, but in these cases the beneficiary's bank may arguably
have breached its section 4A-105 obligation of good faith, which mandates "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards offair dealing. " 46 While 4A-105 does not explicitly impose
an absolute duty of good faith in all cases, section 1-203 requires that
"[e]very ... duty within [the UCC] imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement,"47 and section 3-103's definition of good faith includes reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing. 48 Wire transfers never expressly escape from the 3-103(a)(4)
duty, as they do from the article 4 ordinary care duty, 49 and 3-103's
standard "is consistent with the definition[ ] of good faith applicable to
... 4A."50 Thus, sections 4A-105, 1-203, and 3-103, taken together,
42. See U.C.C. § 4A-207 cmt. 2; Benner, supra note 5, at 252; McKelvy, supra note 5, at 379
(arguing that § 4A-207 is an attempt to "place the risk of loss on the party possessing the most
knowledge of the intended beneficiary and the one who is, therefore, best able to prevent the
loss").
43. U.C.C. § 4A-207(b)(2).
44. U.C.C. § 4A-402(b).
45. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25) ("A person [or organization, U.C.C. § 1-201(30)) 'knows' or has
'knowledge' of a fact when [it] has actual knowledge of it.").
46. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(6) (emphasis added).
47. u.c.c. § 1-203.
48. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4).
49. U.C.C. § 4-103(e).
50. U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt.4.
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mandate that a beneficiary's bank abide by reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing. s1
Careless payment in these cases suggests a deviation from this
duty.s 2 The intuition of bad faith is most powerful where a bank repeatedly pays transfers to or deals with suspicious individuals, especially if the bank relies on the immense volume of the suspicious
customer's business.s3 Were a court to find the bank's payment to the
beneficiary to be unreasonable, s4 the beneficiary's bank's ability to rely
on account numbers alone under 4A-207 would collide headlong with
its duty of good faith as mandated by sections 4A-105, 1-203, and 3103. Even in cases involving unreasonable payment other than in a
name-number fraud, the 4A-105/1-203 reasonable commercial standards requirement also should foreclose reimbursement of the beneficiary's bank. Where the beneficiary's bank's behavior rises to the level
of unreasonable commercial dealing - as might be the case if the bank
casually executes doubtful wire transfers with the knowledge that it
will never bear liability - the 4A-105/1-203 obligation should abrogate sections 4A-201 through 4A-205. The breach of the universal
good faith obligation should prevent the negligent beneficiary's bank
from relying on the exculpatory provisions of article 4A. ss
Beyond questions of good faith, two other 4A sections cast doubts
51. Although a breach of the duty of good faith will probably not support an affirmative
cause of action absent a special relationship between the parties, see, e.g., Trade Indus. Ltd. v.
Brogan, 805 P.2d 54, 61 (Mont. 1991); cf. Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 346,
348 (Ct. App. 1991) (common law contract), § 4A-207's requirements would still conflict with
the§§ 4A-105/1-203/3-103 duty, necessitating a choice of which section to effectuate. Because
the universal sections of article l, including § 1-203, cannot be abrogated in favor of others, see
infra note 55, subordinating the duty of good faith is improper. Negligent behavior would make
the bank liable, whether under§§ 4A-105, 1-203, and 3-103 or, more commonly, under§ 1-103,
see ROBERT A. HILLMAN ET AL., CoMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE ~ 1.04[3] (1985); infra Section 11.B.
Yet, in comparison, commentators have noted that§§ 1-203 and 3-103 might allow a direct
action against a negligent depositary bank in a check transaction, an entity in much the same
position as the beneficiary's bank in a wire transfer. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 711-12 (3d ed. 1988) (handling of checks); see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pac. Natl. Bank, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883, 905 (Ct. App. 1978)
(negligence action against depositary bank "nowhere specifically prohibited by [UCC]").
52. Cf. Richards v. Platte Valley Bank, 866 F.2d 1576, 1583 (10th Cir. 1989) (under Uniform
Fiduciary Act, bad faith inferable where "facts and circumstances are so cogent and obvious that
to remain passive would amount to deliberate desire to evade knowledge").
53. See Maroldy, supra note 19, at 870 (large amounts provide incentive for banks to ignore
potential money-laundering schemes).
54. See supra text accompanying note 43. But see Spak, supra note 3, at 211 (argning that
under § 4A-207, due diligence questions should not arise).
55. The duty of good faith supersedes all other Code requirements. See T.W. Oil, Inc. v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 443 N.E.2d 932, 937 (N.Y. 1982) (good faith and reasonable standards
of fair dealing are "the rule rather than the exception"); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544
P.2d 20, 24 (Wash. 1975) (en bane) (primacy of good faith duty indicates unconscionability of
contract); HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 51. The bad faith payment of a wire transfer thus would
impose liability on the bank by refusing to allow it to assert that the originator or its bank is
liable under 4A. Cf. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Securities Fund Settlement Corp., 710 F. Supp. 991,
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on its consistency towards a negligent beneficiary's bank. Section 4A404 explicitly protects a beneficiary's bank from consequential damages if the bank withholds payment based on a reasonable doubt of the
beneficiary's authority. 56 In other words, article 4A allows a bank to
recognize fraud in some cases but ignore it in others. Finally, section
4A-207(d)(l) grants the customer a right of recovery for name and
number fraud 57 but fails to hold liable the only accessible responsible
party, 58 the beneficiary's bank. The UCC operates at cross-purposes
in cases involving a negligent beneficiary's bank.
Moreover, a beneficiary's bank's rights under article 4A might also
conflict with federal regulations in such cases. Under Department of
Treasury rules, a bank involved in any "deposit, withdrawal, exchange
of currency or other payment or transfer" in excess of $10,000 must
acquire certain information from its payee, including the identity of
both the payee and beneficiary and the number of the account involved. 59 Smaller transfers to an individual totalling over $10,000 also
implicate these federal standards. 60 Even if a bank does not disburse a
wire transfer over the counter, it must preserve a record of large credits transferred to an account. 61 Thus the beneficiary's bank cannot ignore the circumstances in many of these cases.
The Treasury rules minimize the marginally increased burden to a
beneficiary's bank that would accompany a duty to investigate a beneficiary's authority. In cases such as those described in section I.A.l of
this Note, the inquiry should provide information sufficient to meet a
duty of ordinary care. The federal requirements also allow easy discovery of a name and number divergence: the beneficiary's bank's employee normally can crosscheck the information on the bank's
computer in a matter of seconds. Necessity trumps a beneficiary's
998 (D.N.J. 1989) (bank denied right to reimbursement from transferor bank for negligent failure
to cancel payment order).
Article 3 resolves an analogous situation similarly. Where a depositary bank pays on an
obviously unauthorized instrument, it cannot assert holder-in-due course status under § 3-302(a).
The bank in such a case effectively has "notice" from the circumstances of the transaction. See
Wymore State Bank v. Johnson Intl. Co., 873 F.2d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 1989) (bank that failed to
inquire with knowledge of depositor's instability may be sued for negligence); see also U.C.C. § 1201(25)(c); Howard S. Koh, Note, Liability for Lost or Stolen Funds in Cases of Name and
Number Discrepancies in Wire Transfers: Analysis of the Approaches Taken in the United States
and Intemationa/ly, 22 CoRNELL INTL. L.J. 91, 108 (1989).
56. U.C.C. § 4A-404(a); see supra note 28.
57. U.C.C. § 4A-207(d)(l).
58. Responsibility in this Note refers to both unreasonably harmful conduct and failure to
prevent loss though best able to do so. See infra notes 236-38, 240-44 and accompanying text.
59. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(l) (1991) (emphasis added); 31 C.F.R. § 103.38 (1991) (extent of
information required). In these cases, the thieves would most likely not fall under the "established depositor'' exception, see 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(2)(i) (1991), and even if they do, the bank
still must acquire information from them, 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(2)(i) (1991).
60. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(l) (1991).
61. 31 C.F.R. § 103.33(a) (1991).
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bank's objection: if the originator and its bank are unaware of the
fraud, no party but the beneficiary's bank has the opportunity to prevent the loss. If a bank ignores evidence of the beneficiary's specious
authority, its good faith may be suspect. 62 Through compliance, the
bank might even know of a discrepancy between name and number,
preventing reliance on section 4A-207 in the first place. 63 At the very
least, compliance could provide some information for subsequent investigators. Article 4A's provisions flounder in light of these competing standards that federal law already mandates.
Article 4A's loss allocation scheme in these cases bases liability on
either an irrelevant and effectively impossible burden of proof or a rationale inapplicable to fraud discovery, while absolving the party best
able to prevent the loss. 64 Article 4A's provisions may conflict with
federal regulations as well as reasonable standards of fair dealing. In
stark contrast to article 3 and 4 rules, a beneficiary's bank-payor
stands free from liability despite the tell-tale signs before it. Given
4A's dictates, a reasonable solution must lie beyond the immediately
operative provisions. 6 5
B. Negligence Principles in the UCC
1.

Reasonableness Reflected in Article 4A

Assuming the beneficiary's bank to be negligent, a court may want
to allow a suit where article 4A does not, on its face, satisfactorily
assign liability. 66 The language of the Code would likely support such
an action. While 4A's commentary states that "resort to principles of
law or equity outside of Article 4A is not appropriate to create rights,
duties and liabilities inconsistent with those stated in this Article," 67
this Note argues that article 4A's language supports the inference that
negligence is not inconsistent with the Code. 68 Article 4A, while not
See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 31, 35; infra text accompanying notes 245-47.
See Steve H. Nickles, Problems ofSources ofLaw Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code-Part L· The Methodological Problem and the Civil Law Approach, 31 ARK. L. REv.
1, 3 (1977) [hereinafter Nickles, Part I] (The hard cases requiring resort to other law include
62.
63.
64.
65.

"cases in which the language of the statutory provision assumed to be applicable is ambiguous
and ... cases in which the legislation is clear but the result dictated by its application seems
unjust.").
66. See James J. White, Goldstein's Curse, 21 U. ToL. L. REv. 599, 623 (1990) (noting that,
in this type of case, nothing in 4A seems to allow for liability on the negligent beneficiary's bank,
though it probably should be held liable); see also McKelvy, supra note 5, at 373 ("Article 4A ...
creates uncertainty with regard to the potential liability of banks when an unauthorized transfer
occurs in spite of a security procedure but is not caused by the customer.").
67. U.C.C. § 4A-102 cmt.
68. But see A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 400 (article 4A is "designed to fill that
gap" which caused courts to look to outside sources oflaw). As section I.B.1 argues, however,
negligence is not wholly "outside" 4A, nor are 4A's gaps fully filled. See supra section I.A. The
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explicitly recognizing a claim against a beneficiary's bank for negligence, does not necessarily preclude it.
Article 4A is a product of compromise, 69 and seemingly bright-line
rules must be read in light of its many flexible principles. Reasonableness principles in 4A indicate a receptiveness to a negligence suit. For
example, a bank's security procedure must meet only the nebulous
"commercially reasonable" standard to absolve the bank under section
4A-202(a)(i) unless the customer explicitly agreed to a different procedure.70 Section 4A-204(a) shifts the loss of interest to a customer who
"fails to exercise ordinary care" in reporting an unauthorized and ineffective transfer, 71 much like the comparative negligence standards employed for check liability under article 3. 72 Furthermore, a party must
give reasonable notice to render cancellation of a payment order incontestable by the processing bank. 73 In cases where an originator initially authorized a nonetheless erroneous payment order, the bank can
be liable on a last-clear-chance theory of contributory negligence if the
customer can prove that the bank's failure to follow a commercially
reasonable procedure caused the loss; the customer must, in keeping
with the negligence theory, use ordinary care in detecting the error. 74
Additionally, the bank might incur liability for its failure to exercise
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. 75
Though article 4A eschews an explicit ordinary care duty as imposed for paper transactions under section 4-104,76 there are multiple
resort to common law negligence and the question of displacement are addressed in section 11.B,

infra.
69. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 401 ("As a result [of the many groups necessarily
interested in the drafting of article 4A], many of the rules represent compromise provisions,
provisions in which there is a good deal of give and take, and in which perhaps nobody is com·
pletely happy ..• .'').
70. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b)-(c). Courts recognized the propriety of a flexible standard even
before 4A's promulgation. See, e.g., Walker v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 63S F. Supp. 678,
682 (S.D. Tex. 1986) ("[A] depositor may justifiably expect a bank to implement commercially
reasonable internal procedures designed to ..• detect and minimize inaccuracy, and to act
promptly and diligently to remedy error .•• .'').
71. U.C.C. § 4A-204(a); see Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc. v. MidAtlantic Natl. Bank, No.
87-3404, 1991WL336S, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1991), affd., 944 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing proposed article 4A in assessing damages); Baxter & Bhala, supra note IS, at 1497 (describing
in tort-law terms the customer's duty to use ordinary care in examining his bank statement).
72. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
73. U.C.C. § 4A-211(b); see Baxter & Bhala, supra note IS, at 1498.
74. U.C.C. § 4A-20S(a) & cmt. 2.
7S. See Baxter & Bhala, supra note IS, at 1497 ("Some cases suggest that the door is open for
a court to engage in a 'tort-like' inquiry to ascertain [a bank's reasonable fair dealing].''); supra
notes 46, S2, SS and accompanying text. But cf. Richards v. Platte Valley Bank, 866 F.2d IS76
(10th Cir. 1989) (discussing a suit for breach of fiduciary duty against a negligent beneficiary's
bank and requiring actual knowledge for liability); U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt. 4 (good faith not the
same as due care).
76. Carl Felsenfeld, An Evaluation of Proposed Article 4A: Comment on Professor Geva's
Paper, 14 CAN. Bus. L.J. 23S, 238-39 (1988); Wulff, supra note 3, at 108.
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contacts between tort law concepts and article 4A's provisions.77
Where 4A's absolute liability scheme fails to indicate a reasonable solution or where its rationales do not apply, tort law fills the void. An
argument might be made that the explicit inclusion of due care and
negligence concepts in other articles of the UCC and their partial absence in article 4A suggest that the drafters meant to exclude due care
concepts from 4A; they could have more definitely included them, had
they wanted to. Article 4A's inclusion of due care concepts, however,
mitigates this objection for it severely undercuts the apparent contrast
between 4A and the other parts of the Code.
2. Analogies to Other UCC Articles
Other UCC provisions support a negligence standard in certain
cases. Under other Code articles, a party in the same position as a
beneficiary's bank is normally held to a negligence or reasonableness
standard. Of these other Code provisions, negotiable instrument rules
most directly illustrate the applicability of negligence law to wire
transfers. Furthermore, resorting to articles 3 and 4 in wire transfer
cases is not unprecedented. Courts confronting wire transfer issues
prior to the adoption of article 4A relied on the law governing negotiable instruments and bank deposits and collections, comparing a wire
transfer to a paper instrument. 78 Courts recognized that many negotiable instruments, such as certified checks or money orders, are analogous to a wire transfer.79
The creation of article 4A has attenuated the analogy between
checks and wire transfers. The provisions of articles 3 and 4 exclude
wire transfers from those articles' explicit due care standard; 80 a
check, admittedly, is distinguishable in several respects. A check is a
debit transaction, as opposed to a wire transfer credit transaction. 81 In
77. Baxter & Bhala, supra note 15, at 1497 ("The contacts between the law of torts and
Article 4A are less salient than those between the law of contracts and Article 4A. Nevertheless,
there are several such contacts.").
78. See, e.g., Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank- Houston, 790 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir.
1986) (wire transfer analyzed under article 3 and 4 principles); Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) (check collection finality rules); In re
Spears Carpet Mills, Inc., 86 B.R. 985 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987), ajfd., 85 B.R. 86 (W.D. Ark.
1988); cf. Benjamin Geva, The Evolving Law ofPayment by Wire Transfer-An Outsider's View
of Draft Article UCC 4A, 14 CAN. Bus. L.J. 186, 203 (1988) (recognizing that no provision of
then-proposed article 4A explicitly imposed a duty of due care). But see Evra Corp. v. Swiss
Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (common law, not
article 4, guides court); Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 731 F.
Supp. 57, 63 (D. Mass. 1990) (court looks to proposed article 4A instead of articles 3 and 4).
79. See Richards, 866 F.2d at 1580 ("The transfer of funds by cable or telegraph is in law a
check."); Illinois ex rel Lignoul v. Continental Ill. Natl. Bank, 536 F.2d 176, 178 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976) (ATM transaction treated as check). A money order closely resembles a check, see Thompson v. Lake County Natl. Bank, 353 N.E.2d 895, 897 (Ohio 1975);
U.C.C. § 3-104(f) & cmt. 4, and so also parallels the analogous wire transfer.
80. See U.C.C. §§ 3-102(a), 4-104(a)(9).
81. See U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 4. A checkwriter draws on its bank and when the payee
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a check transaction, the paying bank is the first link in the collection
chain. Further, wire transfers usually involve much greater amounts82
and are designed to move funds at high speed and low cost between
sophisticated parties. 83 A check is slower as a function of its paper
form and includes a record, through indorsements, of where it has
traveled.
But attributes common to both checks and wire transfers outweigh
the differences. Wire transfers resemble checks in the ultimate payment process: a party issues a check or a wire to be paid by a distant
bank in most cases, which then relies upon collection from the issuer
back up the chain. Both checks and wire transfers are demands to pay
cash, often enforced in person by the supposed beneficiary. Their form
speeds payment and eases the transfer of funds. A cashier's check or
certified check substantially equals cash84 and therefore functions like
a paper wire transfer. Nor is article 4A divorced from the paper system: funds transfers may be made through a paper payment order85 or
may accompany a check or other negotiable instrument or may even
be effectuated through a negotiable instrument. 86 The claim for comparable analysis should apply even more forcefully to paper funds
transfers, which most closely resemble checks. Disparate standards
for electronic transfers would then require justification - a difficult
proposition, given that article 4A treats paper funds transfers and electronic transfers identically. 87
The similarity between wire transfers and checks indicates that the
provisions of articles 3 and 4 may guide by analogy. 88 Under these
cashes the check the account is debited. A wire transfer originator, in contrast, sends funds - a
credit - and the payee need not enforce payment or debit as with a check.
82. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 399 ("The average wire transfer is in excess of
$2,000,000."). The average check amount has been estimated at $S70. See Hal S. Scott, Corpo·
rate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1664, 1664
(1983).
The larger amounts involved in wire transfers, however, would argue in favor of a beneficiary's bank's liability. Because there will be no further review of the beneficiary's authority once
the payment is released, a beneficiary's bank is the final defense against the thief. Koh, supra
note SS, at 110. In check forgery cases, the drawee bank may at least verify the signature, as it
usually will for large enough amounts, see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note SI, § 6-17, at 713,
and the drawer-account holder similarly may review the checks monthly. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4406(a) (except for truncated accounts).
83. Robert G. Ballen & Natalie H. Diana, The Need for Article 4A, 45 Bus. LAW. 1399,
1399-1400 (1990); see also Jeffrey S. Tallackson & Norma Vallejo, International Commercial
Wire Transfers: The Lack of Standards, 11 N.C. J. INTL. L. & COM. REG. 639, 643 (1986).
84. A bank issuing a certified or cashier's check "accepts" liability for the instrument, see
U.C.C. §§ 3-413 (acceptance), 3-409 (certified check), 3-412 (cashier's check), thereby guaran·
teeing payment.
8S. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(l).
86. U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 5; see also U.C.C. art. 4A Prefatory Note.
87. See U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 6.
88. WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 13.1; see Nickles, Part l supra note 65, at 9 ("[§ 1-102) sanc·
tions ... reasoning by analogy").
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related articles, liability already rests on a failure to use reasonable
care. 89 A comparative negligence framework in articles 3 and 4 allocates losses resulting from forged instruments between the party which
accepted the forgeries and the one which should have been able to
prevent the loss by discovering the thefts.9° Reasonableness of behavior determines liability repeatedly in several comparable negotiable instrument cases: Article 3 precludes a negligent check drawer from
suit; 91 where suspicious circumstances arise, a bank may be liable for
its failure to exercise due care; 92 and if the facts indicate an obvious
fraud, an instrument's taker may have notice under article 3, precluding holder-in-due-course status.93 Finally, articles 3 and 4 often pre89. To be sure, article 4 disclaims any duty of ordinary care with respect to payment orders.
U.C.C. § 4-103; see also U.C.C. §§ 4A-202, 4A-104(a); supra text accompanying note 80. The
hypothetical thefts this Note discusses, however, present a unique issue. The beneficiary's bank
did not mishandle an authorized payment order as under the traditional article 4 standard for
checks - the beneficiaries or accounts described in the order received their money. Rather, loss
resulted from the bank's unreasonable conduct which facilitated the fraud. In such cases, article
4's exclusion of payment orders from its ordinary care duty should not bear upon the general
applicability of a duty of ordinary care to wire transfers. Besides, this Note does not suggest that
article 4 should control these cases, only that article 3 and 4's principles suggest a superior result
than article 4A and that articles 3 and 4 are not so far removed as to be irrelevant.
90. See U.C.C. §§ 3-404, 3-40S, 3-406. Section 3-40S comment 4 states, after providing an
example where a forged check is deposited in an unauthorized account and then the funds withdrawn by wire transfer, that "[t]he trier of fact could find that Depositary [and here, beneficiary's]
Bank did not exercise ordinary care and that the failure to exercise ordinary care contributed to
the loss suffered." See also Walker v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 63S F. Supp. 678, 682 (S.D.
Tex. 1986) ("[T]he statement of a claim in negligence [against a beneficiary's bank] is consistent
with the explicit language of various provisions of the U.C.C." (citing U.C.C. §§ 3-419, 4-202,
4-203, 4-406)).
91. u.c.c. § 3-406.
92. E.g.. Wymore State Bank v. Johnson Intl. Co., 873 F.2d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1989)
(bank's knowledge of depositor-embezzler's financial instability); AmSouth Bank v. Spigener,
SOS So. 2d 1030, 1038-39 (Ala. 1986) (where "circumstances surrounding [the] transaction ...
dr[a]w [a] check into question," depositary bank should investigate). See generally John W.
Hinchey, An Analysis of Bank Defenses to Check Forgery and Alteration Claims Under Uniform
Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4: Claimants' Negligence and Failure to Give Notice, 10 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1982) (suspicious circumstances in check forgeries require bank to act according to
"reasonable commercial standards"); White, supra note 66, at 60S (describing case where check
forger appeared at a bank with a bottle of champagne to encourage the bank's officers to pay the
funds he sought).
Courts have considered the same principle in wire transfer cases. See, e.g., Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 731 F. Supp. S7, 64 (D. Mass. 1990) (suggesting
that liability may be appropriate where bank was "put on notice that the transaction was ...
irregular''). Looking to article 4A for guidance, the court in Shawmut recognized that "[a]s a
practical matter, the [beneficiary's] bank probably is in a better position to recover the funds
from the beneficiary, especially where the beneficiary is a customer." 731 F. Supp. at 64. In the
cases this Note discusses, the beneficiary's bank deals with the thieves and should at least bear
some responsibility where, as in Shawmut, it "blithely executes payment orders without exercising even ordinary care." 731 F. Supp. at 64; cf. Richards v. Platte Valley Bank, 866 F.2d 1S76,
1578, 1S83 (10th Cir. 1989) (no duty actively to inquire in suit for breach of fiduciary duty, but
may not ignore obvious signs of fraud); FDIC v. Imperial Bank, 8S9 F.2d 101, 103 (9th Cir.
1988) (no duty to inquire where circumstances would not have aroused suspicion); Walker, 63S
F. Supp. at 682 (duty to inquire in pre-4A wire transfer derived from implied contract between
bank and customer).
93. U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(l); see supra note SS.
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sume that the party who actually dealt with the thief is best able to
prevent the loss and hold it liable. 94
This article 3 and 4 loss-allocation scheme suggests that in the similar situation involving wire transfer loss, a court should not ignore the
beneficiary's bank. In the wire transfer fraud cases where the originator and the originator's bank are innocent, the beneficiary's bank is
analogous to the acceptor of the forgery and is the party best able to
prevent loss. Failure to hold the beneficiary's bank liable would sanction, or at least not discourage, disregard of federal reporting regulations. Further, in these wire transfer cases, the beneficiary's bank is
also the most comparatively negligent party, the one presented with
suspicious circumstances, the one who actually and finally dealt with
the thief. UCC liability frequently rests upon loss-prevention cost, as
in much of negligence law. 95 The beneficiary's bank's negligent payment of a wire transfer fits all the liability criteria had the transaction
been a paper one.
Objections to liability for the beneficiary's bank include the potential increase in cost and decrease in speed. 96 However, the allowance
for paper funds transfers and the mandatory federal inquiries undermine these claims. Furthermore, a limited duty for the bank should
not significantly complicate these transactions. The beneficiary's bank
need inquire or refuse to pay only where it is reasonably aware of a
danger. The facts surrounding a single transfer, such as the behavior
of the beneficiary or the amount of a transfer to an unknown customer, can alert the bank. Alternatively, multiple transfers to an individual the bank should know, through common knowledge or its own
inquiry, is either involved in criminal activity or suffering financially
should call the bank's attention to a possible fraud. Repeated discrepancies between payment orders' facial directions and the actual account that receives the money similarly should warn the bank just as
they commonly do in check cases.
When the duty arises, confirmation or approval from the origina94. See U.C.C. §§ 3-417 (successive presentment warranty suits over a forged instrument
would follow the chain of transfer to hold the one who took from the thief liable), 3-420 cmt. 1
(under presentment warranty action, where a drawee sues the depositary bank, "[t]he loss will
fall on the person who gave value to the thieffor the check"), 3-307(b) (notice to bank of breach
of fiduciary duty places loss on depositary bank), 3-404 cmt. 3 (fictitious payee) ("[A) drawer
[who draws a check upon inducement by an impostor] is in the best position to avoid the fraud
and thus should take the loss."), 3-405 cmt. 1 (liability of negligent employer for acts of embezzling employee) ("fl1he employer is in a far better position to avoid the loss by care in choosing
employees, in supervising them, and in adopting [security procedures]."), 4-207 to 4-208 (as in
article J's warranties, the parties would sue their transferors until the one who took from the
thief is left liable).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), where
Judge Learned Hand articulated his now-famous definition of negligent behavior: where the cost
of prevention not undertaken is less than the potential loss reduced by its probability of occurrence, a party is liable.
96. See U.C.C. art. 4A Prefatory Note.
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tor or its bank should fulfill the duty. 97 Once the beneficiary's bank
notifies the originator's bank of its doubts, the originator's bank can
contact its customer for more information: Who is this person? Do
you normally make repeated transfers like this to an account at the
beneficiary's bank? Does the amount sound right? Responsibility
then would rest with the potential victim, on whom the beneficiary's
bank can rely for instructions. A duty on the beneficiary's bank would
arise only in the limited number of cases where a reasonable bank
would question the authenticity of the payments. The bank will often
already have the information and will not need to make any further
inquiry than that described above. The final determination in a given
case would be for the jury, which could weigh the actual burden and
decide whether a reasonable bank would have inquired further, subject
to judicial control.
A reasonable care duty would not hamper the processing of funds
transfers to an extent great enough to deny the duty. 98 After all, the
checking system seeks to move funds quickly, but negligence principles still apply to check handling. 99 These two similar Code systems
need not be treated radically differently.
Analogy to two other apposite UCC articles, 5 (Letters of Credit)
and 7 (Warehouse Receipts), initially suggests a more relaxed standard
for the beneficiary's bank than a duty of reasonable care. Both articles
provide for disposition of goods or funds on the mere appearance of
documentary proof, regardless of the reality of the authorization.
Under section 5-109(2), a bank need only "ascertain that on their face
[documents presented under a letter of credit] appear to comply with
the terms of the credit." If they do, a bank must pay the letter's presenter despite his actual authority. Through section 7-403, a holder of
a document evidencing the right to delivery may claim warehoused
goods even if he is not the true owner. In these cases, the bank or
warehouseman must release funds or goods to the party analogous to
the beneficiary in a wire transfer without concern for his legitimacy.
These article 5 and 7 rules seemingly indicate that a beneficiary's bank
should bear no duty to inquire or question the beneficiary's authority.
Due care or analogous principles, however, also limit article 5 and
7's apparently strict requirements. Consider letter of credit transac97. In large transactions a bank currently must verify the payee's identity. See supra notes
59-61 and accompanying text.
98. See Koh, supra note 55, at 112 (arguing that, "[c]onsidering the potential vulnerabilities
of the wire transfer system, it would not be unduly burdensome for the last bank in the chain of
messages to make a final check," but suggesting payment by number). But cf Esposito, supra
note 5, at 94 (arguing that the UCC rules governing check transactions and their corresponding
duty are "unwarranted" for wire transfers); see French, supra note 15, at 1426 (noting the concern, during the drafting of 4A, about potential delays).
99. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 229.38(a) (1992) ("A bank shall exercise ordinary care and act in
good faith in complying with [check collection] requirements."); supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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tions, where the bank must still act in good faith and observe general
banking norms, examining documents with care to ensure authenticity.100 Also, a warehouseman, akin to the beneficiary's bank in a wire
transfer, must act in good faith and observe standards of a "reasonably
careful man" in the same circumstances or face liability. 101 Negligence standards surface repeatedly in these other UCC articles.
The principles of negligence liability sprinkled throughout article
4A, supplemented by their use in situations analogous to wire transfers
in articles 3, 4, 5, and 7, strongly imply that negligence is not incompatible with article 4A. The party parallel to the beneficiary's bank in
these other articles would incur liability for its negligence. But 4A's
disquieting operation - liability on innocent parties unable to prevent
losses, release of the most unreasonable actor, and internal Code contradiction - suggests that a coherent application of due care concepts
requires resort to law outside the ucc. 102 Whether courts may look
to the common law of negligence, however, depends on the extent to
which article 4A displaces its principles.
II.

EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT INCORPORATION OF EXTRA-CODE
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY

This Part examines how the common law and regulatory systems
apart from the UCC determine liability for the negligent payment of a
fraudulent wire transfer and whether the Code displaces or incorporates this extra-Code framework. Section II.A. I discusses the law applied to wire transfers before the enactment of article 4A, including
both common law principles and occasional judicial references to articles 3 and 4. Section II.A.2 explains the regulatory framework and
local practices accepted by UCC section 4A-501(b) which support the
application of negligence. Section II.B examines courts' and commentators' analyses of UCC section 1-103's inclusion of extra-Code law
and derives a section 1-103 framework to determine the state of negligence liability after article 4A. This Part concludes that 4A does not
clearly displace common law negligence liability. Further, this Part
maintains, article 4A's incorporation of the regulatory framework and
100. u.c.c. § 5-109(1)-(2).
101. u.c.c. § 7-204(1).
102. Cf. Tallackson & Vallejo, supra note 83, at 665 (arguing that the common law's flexibility may be desirable and has not yet paralyzed the electronic banking system, but also recommending certainty). But see Baxter & Bhala, supra note 15, at 1507 ("[T]he draftspersons sought
to control carefully the contacts which Article 4A would have with other bodies of law•••• The
unintended importation of a common law doctrine would upset that balance, just like a foreign
bacteria can adversely affect a healthy organism.").
Not only do several provisions in 4A support negligence liability, this Note argues that such a
standard is necessary in these cases to remedy the harsh and questionable results 4A apparently
requires - that is, if 4A can be applied consistently at all. See supra section I.A.3.
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section 1-103's common law supplementation of the UCC sanction a
negligence action against a beneficiary's bank.
A. Extra-Code Law

The UCC includes two avenues to extra-Code law. Article 4A itself contemplates non-Code banking regulations and section 1-103 allows for consideration of common law and equitable principles. This
section discusses extra-Code law particularly relevant to a beneficiary's bank's handling of a wire transfer. The section first considers
common law principles articulated prior to 4A's enactment; it then
examines negligence-like reasonableness concepts in the regulatory
framework in which wire transfers occur. This section concludes that
this extra-4A law lends support to the application of negligence law to
parties nominally covered by article 4A.
1. Pre-4A Wire Transfer Liability
Wire transfers, and questions of liability, existed well before article
4A. Reasonable-care principles frequently determined responsibility.
Many courts turned to common law theories, particularly negligence,
to resolve disputes involving erroneous or unauthorized wire transfers.103 In Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 104 the Seventh Circuit upheld negligence liability for the mishandling of a wire transfer, denying
recovery only as to consequential damages. Other courts have raised
issues of due care under other common law theories, such as breach of

103. See, e.g., FDIC v. Imperial Bank, 859 F.2d 101, 103 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying liability of
beneficiary's bank on proximate cause grounds under state tort law); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank
Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957-59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (denying consequential
damages for mishandled wire transfer but accepting application of common law negligence theory); Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 731 F. Supp. 57, 64 (D.
Mass. 1990) ("The issue before the Court •.. is whether [the beneficiary's bank] was somehow
put on notice that the transaction was so irregular that it should have investigated the circumstances prior to crediting the account ..•• [Liability may attach where a bank] blithely executes
payment orders without exercising even ordinary care."); Walker v. Texas Commerce Bank,
N.A., 635 F. Supp. 678, 682-83 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (negligence suit against bank for erroneous
handling of payment order under implied contract to use ordinary care); Securities Fund Servs.,
Inc. v. American Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 542 F. Supp. 323, 327 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (denial of
summary judgment; complaint stated adequate claim in negligence); Nagle v. LaSalle Natl.
Bank, 472 F. Supp. 1185, 1190-91 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (denial of summary judgment where genuine
issue of material fact existed); Central Coordinates, Inc. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 494
N.Y.S.2d 602, 604 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("[F)ailure to transfer funds ... in a reasonably prompt
manner can result in ... damages .•. •");see also DONALD I. BAKER & ROLAND E. BRANDEL,
THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYsrEMS, 1[ 29.03[2)[d) (2d ed. 1988).
104. 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
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fiduciary duty, 105 agency, 10 6 and contract. 107 The theory of equitable
negligence also supported pre-4A negligence liability. 108 Equitable
negligence seeks after the fact "to place responsibility for a loss on the
party best able to prevent the harm." 109 The party more at fault bears
the loss under what is essentially a modified comparative negligence
scheme. 110 Wire transfers were not alien to the common law before
4A.
Courts have also looked to articles 3 and 4 - with the resulting
importation of due care - in wire transfer cases, treating wire transfers as instruments. 111 For example, in Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 112 the Second Circuit analogized acceptance
of a payment order to final payment of a check. In cases involving
liability on negotiable instruments themselves, in many ways comparable to electronic funds transfers, 113 courts accepted the application of
negligence principles. 114 Before article 4A, courts employed these
105. Richards v. Platte Valley Bank, 866 F.2d 1576 (10th Cir. 1989).
106. Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1051-52 (2d Cir.
1979) (negligence standard applied under implied agency); see also Shawmut, 731 F. Supp. at 63
(examining agency theory but determining that beneficiary's bank would not be liable under such
a cause of action); Geva, supra note 78, at 190-91 (describing the potential agency liability of 11
party to an EFr, but uncertain as to beneficiary's banks); cf. Childs v. Federal Reserve Bank, 719
F.2d 812, 814 (5th Cir. 1983) (agency in check collection).
107. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Securities Settlement Corp., 710 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D.N.J. 1989)
(bank liable for breach of contract to use ordinary care in handling of wire transactions); accord
Walker, 635 F. Supp. at 683.
108. See, e.g., First Bank of N.D. (N.A.)- Jamestown v. Pillsbury Co., 801 F.2d 1036 (8th
Cir. 1986) (sale of goods financed by security interest).
109. Pillsbury, 801 F.2d at 1039.
110. See Robert S. Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 906, 918 (1978). This Note discusses the importance
of this principle as an equitable remedy, as opposed to an action at law, infra at text accompanying note 167.
111. Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank - Houston, 790 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 1986)
(electronic funds transfer analyzed as paper transaction); Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) (analogy to acceptance of and liability for
checks "would support" court's wire transfer analysis); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F.
Supp. 820, 828 (N.D. Ill. 1981), modified, vacated in part, revd. in part, 673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (analogy to collecting bank's duty of due care); Miracle
Hills Ctr. Ltd. Partnership v. Nebraska Natl. Bank, 434 N.W.2d 304, 306 (Neb. 1984). But see
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982)
(rejecting applicability of article 4); Walker, 635 F. Supp. at 681 (same); Koh, supra note 55, at
107 (some courts relied solely on common law).
112. 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 79, 84-86.
114. See, e.g., Wymore State Bank v. Johnson Intl. Co., 873 F.2d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 1989);
New Jersey Bank, N.A. v. Bradford Sec. Operations, Inc., 690 F.2d 339, 345, 347 (3d Cir. 1982)
(negligent transferor of security may be liable); AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. Spigener, 505 So. 2d
1030, 1036 (Ala. 1986); Thompson v. Lake County Natl. Bank, 353 N.E.2d 895, 897 (Ohio 1975)
(negligent cashing of money order); cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cosby, 99 S.W.2d 662, 664
(Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (accepting applicability of negligence in failure to identify telegraph recipient but finding no tort in instant case).
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UCC concepts in addition to law and equity principles to hold the
negligent party responsible.
Concededly, the enactment of 4A makes this pre-1989 case law
suspect. First, these cases are of limited value, because any court deciding the same question today would examine article 4A, which
might dictate or suggest a different result. Second, because the cases
applying common law or other extra-Code theories of liability are admittedly few, they form a patchwork liability system115 when compared to the new UCC article. However, the drafters of article 4A
acted in a legal context which included the common law, 116 so the
prior law of wire transfers helps explicate the drafters' intent and the
meaning of article 4A's provisions. In addition, the fact that a decision preceded article 4A is much less relevant if the Code article did
not displace the cause of action. 117 If 4A incorporates the extra-Code
liability, a court should not disregard the extra-Code principles, despite the fragmentary or nonuniform nature of the prior law alone.
2. Incorporation of the Regulatory Framework
Within the rules established by the many wire transfer networks,
negligence-like or fault-based liability survives. Fedwire118 rules provide that a sending bank that fails to use due care in discovering an
unauthorized payment order will not receive interest damages if it
seeks repayment. 119 CHIPS 120 places the loss on the party at whose

115. See Bradford Trust, 790 F.2d at 408 (district court below had "no well-defined body of
law that clearly applied to resolve [wire transfer] case"); Shawmut Worcester County Bank v.
First Am. Bank & Trust, 731 F. Supp. 57, 62 (D. Mass. 1990); see also A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 4, at 400; Benner, supra note 5, at 241 (the common law and article 4 "have proved
inadequate" for liability determinations); Geva, supra note 78, at 193; Ernest T. Patrikis et al.,
Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and the Role of Counsel, 23 UCC L.J. 219, 223
(1991); Scott, supra note 82, at 1678 (discussing never-adopted Uniform New Payments Code
and state of case law through 1982).
116. Cf. Nickles, Part/, supra note 65, at 9-10 (original UCC enacted with extant common
law in mind).
117. See infra section 11.B.
·11s. Fedwire is the Federal Reserve electronic funds transfer system. See 12 C.F.R. § 210
(1992).
119. 12 C.F.R. § 210.28(c) (1992). In several other respects, the regulations apply 4A's
framework to Federal Reserve Banks, except where inconsistent with other Fedwire provisions.
See 12 C.F.R. § 210.25(b).
120. CHIPS is the Clearing House Interbank Payment System, based in New York, which
processes EFfs between U.S. and foreign banks. BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 103, 1] 1.03[9],
at 1-29; see also Wulff, supra note 3.
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location the fraud occurred, 121 though SWIFf 122 system rules do not
govern liability between participants. 123 But most significantly for due
care concepts, regional banking practices and local automated clearing
house (ACH) rules also govern liability. Each of the 29 regional
ACHs may have its own distinct rules, 124 and courts have considered
compliance with these local rules in determinations of negligence liability.125 In the regulatory framework outside article 4A, negligence
or quasi-negligence principles often govern parties' behavior.
Article 4A directly adopts the fault-based liability rules of these
private wire transfer networks. Under section 4A-50l(b)(ii), unless article 4A provides otherwise, "a funds-transfer system rule governing
rights and obligations between participating banks ... may be effective
even ifthe rule conflicts with [4A]." Hence, a bank's failure to comply
with its ACH rules may result in liability regardless of the outcome
under article 4A. Where these rules establish standards of ordinary
care, courts will incorporate negligence into article 4A.
Further, the federal reporting requirements impose national standards and therefore a uniform measure of regulatory due care. A bank
that disregards the Treasury rules which do not directly create a negligence action deviates from the socially demanded norm - like any
other tortfeasor. Given the looming federal requirements and the
many individual ACH liability frameworks, a negligence action appears consonant with the regulations governing wire transfers. 126
Thus both regulatory standards and the prior case law support a com121. Robert C. Effros, A Banker's Primer on The Law of Electronic Funds Transfers, 105
BANKING L.J. 510, 517 (1988); Esposito, supra note 5, at 81. The C.H.I.P.S. determination thus
requires locating the place of the fraud. The most reasonable conclusion is that fraud occurs at
the beneficiary's bank, because the only face-to-face contact likely occurs there, and damages are
not incurred until the beneficiary's bank releases the funds. At any other location, there is no
human interaction directly and.finally resulting in payment.
122. SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide International Funds Transfers, handles intema·
tional transfers. BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 103, ~ 1.03[9], at 1-28.
123. Id.; Esposito, supra note 5, at 81.
124. BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 103, ~ 19.02.
125. See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Securities Settlement Corp., 710 F. Supp. 991, 996 & n.5
(D.N.J. 1989) (analyzing local rules to determine standard of care); In re Spears Carpet Mills, 86
B.R. 985, 993 (Bankr W.D. Ark. 1987), ajfd., 85 B.R. 86 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (local settlement
rules).
126. Cf. French, supra note 15, at 1441 (regulations outside 4A do not directly alter rights of
nonbank sender but may do so indirectly by affecting banks). Some courts refuse to recognize
the regulations' impact. See, e.g., Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. First Am. Bank & Trust,
731 F. Supp. 57, 63 (D. Mass. 1990) ("[T]he regulatory framework that undergirds the parties'
relationship cannot support the conclusion that the receiving bank is an agent for the sender
charged with a duty broader than simply to credit promptly the beneficiary's account."). 4A's
framework, however, explicitly extends beyond mere blind payment. For example, federal re·
porting requirements override any inconsistent article 4A provisions. See U.C.C. § 4A-107.
These various openings to negligence liability are not necessarily error; they may, in the end,
facilitate the development of EFT law. See Tallackson & Vallejo, supra note 83, at 665; see also
infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
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mon law suit against a negligent beneficiary's bank. The next section
addresses the question of displacement of pre-4A common law.

B. Section 1-103 and Survival of Pre-Code Common Law
Article 1 provides the potential conduit for this pre-4A common
law. Section 1-103 implicitly acknowledges that no attempt at a comprehensive delineation of rights can be perfect. 127 Section 1-103 opens
the door to both common law and equity, allowing resort to extraCode law "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of [the
UCC] .... [A]ll supplemental bodies oflaw [continue to apply] except
insofar as they are explicitly displaced." 128 While some commentators
favor reading the "explicitly" requirement out of section 1-103, 129 its
inclusion suggests that the mere existence ofUCC rules in the relevant
area should not alone support a claim of displacement. Unfortunately,
conflicting visions of the drafters' intent 130 limit the legislative history's efficacy as an interpretive tool.
1. Judicial Analysis of Section 1-103
Despite the uncertainty surrounding section 1-103, several cases
suggest a framework for displacement analysis. Starting from the
principle that courts should narrowly construe statutes in derogation
of the common law, 131 courts have looked to the common law where
127. The section provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principle and
agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
U.C.C. § 1-103. Comment 3 clarifies the scope of the section:
The listing given in this section is merely illustrative; no listing could be exhaustive. Nor
is the fact that in some sections particular circumstances have led to express references to
other fields of law intended at any time to suggest the negation of the general application of
the principles of this section.
U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 3.
128. U.C.C. § 1-103 & cmt. 1.
129. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 51, 1f 1.04[2]. Despite this objection, some courts have
held that explicit displacement is indeed needed. Steven B. Dow & Nan S. Ellis, The Payor
Bank's Right to Recover Mistaken Payments: Survival of Common Law Restitution Under Proposed Revisions to Uniform Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4, 65 IND. L.J. 779, 798 & n.85
(1990) (citing cases).
130. Compare Robert A. Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code: U.CC
Section 1-103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 655, 683 (1977) (§ l103's legislative history suggests the section "to be a narrow outlet to common law") with Summers, supra note 110, at 911 ("It is fortunate that the Code drafters saw our general problem [of
inequitable operation of the UCC in certain cases] so clearly."), and at 935 (noting that previous
versions of§ 1-103 had a narrower scope and language than the section as actually enacted).
131. See Dow & Ellis, supra note 129, at 798 n.85 (citing Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth. v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983) (federal eminent domain law's usurpation of state common law principles limited; statutes with "roots" in the common law will not
repeal it unless clear and explicit for this purpose)); see also Demos v. Lyons, 376 A.2d 1352,
1357 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977) ("[The UCC] cannot displace [a] common law [action] by implication from silence."). But see Steve H. Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships Under

2592

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:2565

its application does not explicitly conflict with the UCC and where
other provisions of the Code support the common law principle in
question. 132 Courts will resort to section 1-103 where "gaps in Code
provisions" exist due to either Code silence or "incomplete Code treatment," or where "broad or ambiguous use of terminology by the Code
framers" leaves a court uncertain of the result. 133 The outside law
may coexist with the Code remedy 134 or even expand the UCC if it
fails to provide a remedy for an otherwise cognizable harm. 135 The
"overlapping nature of the two theories," 136 one Code and one common law, provides an additional consideration: if UCC liability requires elements identical to those that constitute the common law
cause of action, the Code potentially displaces the common law.
Courts also analyze the scope of the UCC. Where the Code explicitly provides for results in all potential cases, the common law probably does not apply. 137 Finally, the common law theory advanced
the Uniform Commercial Code - Part II: The English Approach and a Solution to the Methodological Problem, 31 ARK. L. REV. 171 (1977) [hereinafter Nickles, Part II] (UCC was meant to
displace more broadly the common law than statutes normally are considered to have done).
That a court should broadly construe a comprehensive statute such as the UCC might be
advanced to counter the incorporation of common law theories. But the drafters themselves
undercut this argument by including § 1-103 as one of the Code's basic principles. Had the
drafters sought total, absolute displacement of the common law,§ 1-103 would not exist.
132. E.g., Walker v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A., 635 F. Supp. 678, 682 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
133. Hillman, supra note 130, at 673, 666; see Nickles, Part], supra note 65, at 9; see also
Stocking v. Transam Distrib. Servs., Inc., No. 83 C 6122, 1985 WL 6226, at •4 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
12, 1985) (unpublished opinion) (§ 7-204 reasonable care provision does not displace negligence
but merely guides its application). "Where the UCC does not address an issue, one should refer
to the common law for guidance." Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 376 (5th Cir.
1980) (suit by drawer after bank's failure to pay check following erroneous stop-order).
134. See, e.g., Hecker v. Ravenna Bank, 468 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Neb. 1991) (common law supplements § 3-419 conversion action); Robbins v. First Fed. Sav. Bank, 363 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1987) (interest on damages not displaced where allowed under common law conversion
theory).
135. See McNulty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 727 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Mass. 1989) (common law
conversion not displaced where§ 3-419 not "directly applicable"); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. American State Bank, 385 N.W.2d 460, 462-64 (N.D. 1986) (common law, through§ 1-103, extends
the parameters of§ 3-419 conversion to include instrument with missing indorsement as well as
forged indorsement).
136. E.g., Equitable Life Assurance Socy. v. Okey, 812 F.2d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1987); see
Berthot v. Security Pac. Bank, 823 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (UCC conversion, in
providing for specific remedy for payee, displaces negligence action against depositary bank); F &
P Builders v. Lowe's of Tex., Inc., 786 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (§ 2-709(a)(l)
action for the price supplants common law duty to mitigate damages through retrieving goods
from a buyer unable to pay; Code provides specific remedy which allows seller to absolutely
avoid repossession). But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Devon Bank, 702 F.
Supp. 652, 660 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that § 4-202 does not displace California common law
negligence suit for late check return, but denying liability in this case); Hecker. 468 N.W.2d at 95
(conversion action not displaced); Great Am. Ins. Co., 385 N.W.2d at 462-64 (common law conversion principles supplement UCC provision).
137. See, e.g., New Jersey Bank, N.A. v. Bradford Sec. Operations, Inc., 690 F.2d 339, 34546 (3d Cir. 1982); G & R Corp. v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 1171 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (where UCC does not govern precise situation, common law contract principles remain);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pac. Natl. Bank, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883, 902-03 (Ct. App. 1978)
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should not thwart the policies of the UCC, read generally and in the
particular provisions at issue. 138 Thus, courts have examined six elements: (1) direct conflict with UCC language; 139 (2) concord with
other UCC provisions; 140 (3) the Code's specificity and adequacy to
solve the problem; 141 (4) the similarity of the Code to the common law
cause of action; 142 (5) the certainty of the Code's remedy; 143 and (6)
conflict with UCC policies.144
Under these judicial guidelines, article 4A would likely allow a
negligence action against a beneficiary's bank. In the case where
neither the originator nor its bank are at fault but the beneficiary's
bank should reasonably have suspected the fraud, a suit would meet
the courts' requirements. Examining the Code's language first, four
elements support using negligence. First, no direct conflict arises between a negligence action and 4A - such a suit only contravenes
UCC silence. Second, negligence principles are common in Code provisions governing analogous situations, such as forged indorsements
and embezzlement by check. 145 Third, article 4A itself employs negligence or quasi-negligence tort principles to determine the liabilities of
parties other than the beneficiary's bank. 146 Fourth, the language of
4A itself inadequately governs the case of an innocent sender and a
negligent beneficiary's bank, either conflicting with other UCC provisions or resting liability on a prohibitive burden of proof and exonerat("Under§ 3-418, common-law liability is excluded and the controlling question is whether payment of the check [by the drawee] was 'final.'") (citation omitted); Eldon's Super Fresh Stores v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 1973) (holder-in-duecourse protection cuts off negligence action against taker of instrument); Consolidated Water
Supply Dist. No. C-1 v. Farmer's Bank, 686 S.W.2d 844, 8S3 (Mo. Ct. App. 198S) ("padded
payroll" case governed entirely by § 3-40S); Brummund v. First Natl. Bank, 6S6 P.2d 884, 888
(N.M. 1983) (§ 9-311 's allowance for a debtor's disposition of collateral supplies the "entirety" of
the law governing transferability of secured collateral); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Citibank,
N.A., S36 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (N.Y. 1989)(in absence of bad faith, negligence of depositary bank
irrelevant where § 3-40S implicated in "fictitious payee" case; Code section evinces specific
choice to allocate loss to employer in this particular scenario and allowing common law action
would "nulli[fy)" 3-40S); accord Hinkle v. Cornwell Quality Tool Co., S32 N.E.2d 772, 782
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
138. See New Jersey Bank, 690 F.2d at 34S-46. But the many different and at times conflicting policies in the DCC may make them judicially manipulable, allowing easier justification for
resort to outside law. David Frisch, Buyer's Remedies and Warranty Disclaimers: The Case fer
Mistake and the Indetenninacy of U.CC Section 1-103, 43 ARK. L. REv. 291, 337 (1990). For a
discussion of the result of this confusion, see infra section 111.A.2.
139. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 13S and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
14S. See AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. Spigener, SOS So. 2d 1030, 1036 (Ala. 1986); supra notes
24-2S, 91, 94 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 6S-68.
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ing the most culpable party.141
The other judicial factors support common law incorporation as
well. Negligence would expand the parameters of the Code to provide
a remedy supported by other sections' principles, and redress an obvious wrong. A negligence theory comprises different elements than the
theory of strict liability in article 4A, and 4A's liabilities are essentially
contractual, 14s not grounded in tort. Article 4A does not completely
overlap the elements of the common law standard; moreover, its reasonableness threads and regulatory due care reveal at least partial acceptance of negligence liability.
The first five judicial elements suggest an intermediate or probationary acceptance of a negligence action even under 4A. Part III of
this Note addresses any conflict between a negligence action and UCC
policies, the final factor courts have examined. If this last element is
satisfied, the judicial framework would support a common law negligence action against a beneficiary's bank.
An examination of several cases decided under articles 3 and 4 and
involving negotiable instru~ents illustrates the judicial framework's
treatment of negligence principles. Where a bank's behavior did not
meet the particular provisions of articles 3 and 4 and the plaintiff sued
under a theory outside the UCC - like a plaintiff's suing a beneficiary's bank for negligence after the adoption of 4A - courts have allowed the action. In a suit against a depositary bank which paid with
notice of the invalidity of the negotiable instrument presented by the
payee, a common law action survived because a bank's knowledge
prevents holder-in-due-course status and no other theory would allow
a direct suit by the drawer. 149 Likewise, the Code's "rationales [were]
inapplicable" and a payor bank recovered through the equitable principle of restitution, despite the absence of a precise UCC remedy,
where its payee had reason to know of the drawer's insolvency. 150 In a
conversion suit where the failure to exercise due care when paying on
an indorsement was an element of the UCC cause of action, section 3419 displaced common law negligence, 151 a result consistent with the
147. See supra section I.A.
148. See Felsenfeld, supra note 76, at 238-39; Wulff, supra note 3, at 108; cf. In re Spears
Carpet Mills, Inc., 86 B.R. 985 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987), affd., 85 B.R. 86 (W.D. Ark. 1988)
(finding pre-4A wire transfer liability to be contractual, based on customer's dealings with bank).
149. Wymore State Bank v. Johnson Intl. Co., 873 F.2d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 1989) (employer may sue depositary bank for its negligence for allowing payment on indorsements forged
by employee).
150. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., 804 F.2d 1487, 1496 (9th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987).
151. Equitable Life Assurance Socy. v. Okey, 812 F.2d 906, 908-09 (4th Cir. 1987) (overlapping nature of two causes of action allows § 3-419, implicating due care concepts, to displace
negligence); cf. Penalosa Coop. Exch. v. A.S. Polonyi Co., 745 F. Supp. 580, 584 (W.D. Mo.
1991) (common law negligence action not displaced by UCC conversion where state law requires
refusal of depositor-payor to return instrument, not just acceptance and presentment of
instrument).
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denial of causes of action overlapping the elements of Code liability.
Where a drawer's suit against a depositary bank collided with final
payment immunity, the Code displaced the common law because the
language of the UCC flatly cuts off any cause of action, 152 whether
within or without the Code. Courts have resorted to outside law, despite its tendency to frustrate the Code's system, 153 where causes of
action distinct from UCC theories are asserted and other provisions
and principles in the Code support the claim.
These interpretations of articles 3 and 4's incorporation of the
common law imply that a negligence action survives in the wire transfer cases presented by this Note. Like a depositary bank that pays
over an obvious forgery, a beneficiary's bank that doubts the beneficiary's authority 154 should have notice from the circumstances. Duecare principles would not replicate the beneficiary's bank's current 4A
liability and therefore should remain, for unlike 3-419's usurpation of
common law negotiable instrument conversion, no UCC provision applicable to the beneficiary's bank includes due care elements. And in
contrast to the negotiable instrument situation noted above , where the
UCC flatly dismissed a cause of action, a beneficiary's bank may bear
liability to at least the beneficiary if it fails to execute a payment order
properly 155 and probably to another party if it fails to act in good
faith.15 6 A negligence suit against a beneficiary's bank, as in these
analogous negotiable instrument cases, arises outside the UCC but is
supported from within by other Code provisions.
2. Scholarly Commentary
Scholarly criticism of section 1-103 and its judicial interpretations
also suggests a framework for incorporation analysis. Commentators
recognize that situations exist where courts should be able to supplement the Code with outside principles. The argument for supplementation with common law principles is strongest where the policy of the
152. Perini Corp. v. First Natl. Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 416 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane).
153. Not all commentators approve, however. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 51, § 161, at 690 ("To grant •.. affirmative claims based on negligence willy-nilly is to throw sand in the
gears of a carefully designed machine. The nonnegligence theories of liability [in articles 3, 4,
and 5] ••• have been carefully worked out by the drafters and for the most part constitute an
entirely sensible allocation of the risks of fraud loss.").
Yet when the not-for-the-most-part case occurs, the language will not be clear or the UCC
will fail; in those cases courts have looked to outside law, as this Note argues they may need to
do in cases nominally under article 4A. Furthermore, the risk of upsetting the delicate balance of
articles 3 and 4 is less significant since the adoption of comparative negligence principles in the
amendments to those articles. This recent infusion of flexible standards indicates that more balancing is appropriate.
154. Article 4A recognizes that the beneficiary's bank may withhold payment from the beneficiary based on a reasonable doubt about the beneficiary's authorization. See U.C.C. § 4A404(a).
155. See U.C.C. § 4A-404{a)-{b) {damages for erroneous transmittal of funds).
156. See supra notes 46-52, 55 and accompanying text.
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UCC comports with the common law or where the Code's policy is
conflicting or vague. 157 Reading the Code's particular provisions in
light of section 1-102, courts improperly resort to the common law
where the "common law rule conflicts with clearly defined Code purposes and policies which apply to the problem." 158 Analogous Code
provisions159 and the Code's language directly bearing on the particular issue reflect UCC policy with which common law theory should
not conflict. Finally, a court should "prune back the Code" and disregard its statutory boundaries "where the reason of the limitation does
not apply" 160 - where displacement would not serve the Code's purposes. This search for conflict first with particular Code language and
then with Code policies allows for either explicitt61 or implicit162 displacement of the common law. The analysis requires an examination
of the entirety of the UCC.
Not all commentators fully adhere to this mainstream scholarly
analysis. Professor Summers, for example, would allow outside principles of equity to supplement the UCC more frequently. Section 1-103,
Summers argues, imposes a duty on a judge to look beyond the Code
when equitable considerations are necessary to prevent injustice. 163
The drafters purposely authorized resort to outside law to prevent
judges from bending Code provisions or indulging in dishonest reasoning to reach correct results: overt recognition of an outcome's true
grounding, whether equity or the Code, is preferable in the long
run. 164 Therefore, Summers reasons, section 1-103 must be broadly
construed as a recognized judicial tool. Explicit recognition of an equitable principle in other parts of the Code provides additional support
for incorporation of an equitable theory. 165 Summers concludes that
the UCC displaces an equitable principle only when the language, policies and analogous Code provisions all militate against its inclusion.166 Summers' theory should be applicable to actions at law as
157. See Hillman, supra note 130, at 687; Nickles, Part II, supra note 131, at 227 ("The
principles of law and equity are not displaced by the provisions of the Code and should supplement them in any case where their application more definitely will promote the orderly conduct
of commercial affairs [under] the Code.") (footnote omitted).
158. Hillman, supra note 130, at 687-88 (emphasis added). The interaction between common
law negligence and Code policy is more fully explored in section 111.A.2, infra.
159. Hillman, supra note 130, at 682.
160. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 51, 1J l.04[2] (quoting U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1).
161. See Dow & Ellis, supra note 129, at 798 (noting that courts have required clear displace·
ment by Code language). Some commentators argue that explicit displacement is not required by
§ 1-103. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
162. See Dow & Ellis, supra note 129, at 799 (displacement through indirect conflict between
UCC principles and common law principle); Hillman, supra note 130, at 687-88 (same).
163. Summers, supra note 110, at 909.
164. Id. at 910.
165. Id. at 918.
166. Id. at 938.
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well, with a caveat: because the Code itself supplants prior legal provisions, the survival of common law causes of action appears more suspicious. Equity, after all, is a remedial tool that courts employ after
the fact; law, like the Code, is meant to proscribe behavior and influence parties before a dispute arises.167
This scholarly criticism, both Summers' and the more conservative
view, supports the survival of negligence liability for a beneficiary's
bank after article 4A. Under their analyses, the Code's provisions do
not clearly supplant negligence liability. 168 Consider the case in section I.A.1 where an embezzling officer or known criminal, perhaps an
individual with a readily discoverable history of fraud, opens an account with a bank and immediately begins accepting large wire transfers. The commentators' analyses suggest that a beneficiary's bank
which allows the transfers should still be subject to a common law
negligence claim.
Five factors support the claim that article 4A does not displace a
common law negligence action. First, through the security procedure
requirements 4A apparently seeks to assign liability based upon blame.
Negligence liability for the beneficiary's bank that should suspect the
impropriety of the transfers to its customer's account upholds that
goal. Second, the policies inherent in articles 3 and 4, which support
greater payor liability, contradict 4A's seeming allowance of a beneficiary's bank to ignore evidence of fraud and freely pay a questionable
beneficiary. Third, the availability of a negligence claim in this scenario comports with much of the Code169 and would allow a result consistent with that in the comparable situation involving forged checks
cashed in breach of fiduciary duty. 17 Fourth, the "reasons of the limitation" on the beneficiary's bank's liability - speed 171 and loss prevention172 - do not apply in these wire transfer cases. In the case of
an innocent originator, the security procedure rules do not prevent
loss; 173 and in the name and number cases, the beneficiary's bank can
best discover the fraud and moreover, because of the amounts likely

°

167. Id. at 925, 936-37. But negligence is less susceptible to this criticism, for not only is the
concept an equitable as well as legal one, see supra text accompanying notes 108-10, the unsatisfactory operation of article 4A in these wire transfer cases, see supra section I.A, fails to warn the
parties and adequately proscribe their behavior.
168. See Hillman, supra note 130, at 687-88 (arguing for common law supplementation
where Code's policy is too vague to establish); id. at 695 ("In some situations ... through close
analysis a court may conclude that both express Code language and Code purposes and policies
are hopelessly unclear or contradictory. Where that is so, a resort to the common law is
justified.").
169. See supra notes 70-75, 89-94 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
171. U.C.C. art. 4A Prefatory Note; § 4A-207 cmt. 2.
172. See U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 3 (security procedure requirement meant to prevent theft).
173. See WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 1.3 (no system completely secure); infra text accompanying note 247.
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involved, already must often delay payment to verify the beneficiary's
identity.
Summers' theory clearly supports negligence liability, through
"conservative" scholarly analysis. The UCC lacks the unified front
needed to displace the common law: some of the language of 4A emits
due-care principles, as do Code policies 174 and parallel sections in articles 3 and 4. Judicial application of negligence principles would override parts of the UCC but allow the court to do justice without
straining for a fictional, Code-based legitimation for the outcome.
Both courts' and scholars' analyses thus suggest that 4A incorporates, rather than displaces, negligence. The courts' and commentators' approaches examined in the context of a negligence action against
a beneficiary's bank indicate survival of the common law. The certainty of this proposition, however, depends upon the conflict, if any,
between a common law negligence action and Code policies. This implicit displacement of common law negligence by UCC policies, 175 the
sixth consideration the cases advance and a major concern of the commentators, is more problematic. Part III addresses this interaction between UCC policy and common law negligence.
III.

NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY

AND

QUESTIONS OF POLICY

Conflict with UCC purposes presents the final challenge to a common law theory. An analysis of whether common law survives compares that law to general Code policies and to those policies derived
from both directly relevant and analogous provisions. 176 As Code policy comports with the common law theoryI 7 7 and, implicitly, when
policies suggesting displacement are weak, the common law more
likely survives. Aside from displacement analysis, extra-Code policy
considerations also indicate from a societal perspective what party
should ideally bear the loss to promote fairness and efficiency, regardless of precise UCC goals.
This Part discusses the policy implications of a negligence action
against a beneficiary's bank. Section III.A.1 details both explicit and
implicit policies of the UCC as a whole and article 4A in particular.
The section then argues that the Code's manifold and sometimes divergent policy scheme both supports and contradicts common law liability. Section III.A.2 examines the actual interaction between UCC
policy and negligence principles, the final consideration necessary to
allow a common law action. The section maintains that negligence
liability does not conflict prohibitively with these policies and in fact
174.
175.
176.
177.

See infra notes 226-29, 265-67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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supports many of them, fulfilling the last requirement for common law
incorporation. Section III.B argues that overarching policy, derived
from both the Code's liability principles and independent societal concerns, supports the survival of common law liability and buttresses the
claim that article 4A should not preclude a negligence action against a
beneficiary's bank in certain cases. This Part concludes that the lack
of clear harm to stated UCC policies, the Code's underlying acceptance of due care principles, and overarching societal interests warrant
allowing a claim against the negligent beneficiary's bank.
A.
1.

UCC Policies and Negligence Liability

The Goals of the Uniform Commercial Code

Like much legislation, the UCC explicitly sets forth its policy
goals. The Code "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
[the] underlying purposes and policies" of simplification, clarification
and modernization of commercial law, permitting the expansion of
commercial practices "through custom, usage and agreement," and
uniformity of the law. 178 The drafters wanted parties to know their
respective rights and liabilities to foster easy resolution of disputes. 179
As a commercial code, the UCC also advances several implicit
purposes. Foremost, UCC rules should promote commerce. 180
Courts, in interpreting the Code, will seek to "serve[ ] the needs of the
particular commercial situation." 181 Administrative efficiency, especially the avoidance of excessive litigation, also guides courts in cases
under the Code. 182 Section l-203's duty of good faith dealing, 183 the
prohibition on disclaimers of all duties of due care, 184 emphases on
178. u.c.c. § 1-102 (1)-(2).
179. Bryan D. Hull, Common Law Negligence and Check Fraud Loss Allocation: Has Common Law Supplemented or Supplanted the U.CC?, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 605, 608 (1990); see also
White v. Hancock Bank, 477 So. 2d 265, 273 (Miss. 1985) (UCC meant to allow "predictability
of consequences of behavior").
180. Cf. Hull, supra note 179, at 614 (stating that articles 3 and 4 should be interpreted to
promote the use of checks).
181. HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 51, 11 l.06[2][a] (discussing policy toward extra-Code
incorporation).
182. Id. 11 l.06[2][d][iii] (allowing direct suit against a negligent bank is one manner to prevent waste in these cases). Simplification of the law is furthered, for example, by avoidance of
circuitous litigation in check cases where no direct action between a drawer and collecting bank
is provided by the UCC. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Purdue Natl. Bank, 401 N.E.2d
708, 714 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (UCC interpreted to avoid "cumbersome and uneconomical circuity of actions"); see also Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank- Houston, 790 F.2d 407, 409
(5th Cir. 1986) (UCC encourages finality in transactions to prevent repeated suits).
183. U.C.C. § 1-203. The requirement of good faith supersedes all others. See supra note 55.
184. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) ("[T]he obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care
prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement ....").
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reliance and notice to hold a party liable, 185 implied warranties, 186 rescission for unconscionability, 187 and the provision for full compensation of injured parties 188 all reflect a third implicit policy, ensuring
fairness in commercial transactions. Finally, the "rule of reasonableness" guides any construction of the UCC and its provisions. 189 Thus,
the Code's policies should not direct absurd results.
Beyond abstract notions of fairness, the Code evidences a system
for the imposition of liability based on the level of an actor's awareness
- from intentional acts to those done in complete ignorance.19o This
scheme operates alongside the explicit duty of reasonableness. 191 As
in tort law, these standards support the UCC's deterrence policies.192
If the thief escapes a victim's suit, the party that dealt with the thief
will bear liability, based on the assumption that the party best able to
detect the fraud is the most culpable of those remaining. 193
185. The UCC will in many instances exonerate a party that did not have notice of a claim to
goods. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-312(1)(b) (buyer without knowledge has warranty of good title), 2403, 1-201(9) (rights of a buyer in the ordinary course of business), 3-302 (holder in due course of
negotiable instrument), 9-301, 9-307 (superiority of buyer without notice over holder of security
interest in goods), 9-401 (party with knowledge may not assert erroneous filing of financing
statement and take free of security interest in goods); see also Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, 544
P.2d 20, 22 (Wash. 1975). And where a party changes position in reliance on another, mistaken
payments may not be recovered from a transferor ofa negotiable instrument. U.C.C. § 3-418(c).
186. u.c.c. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
187. u.c.c. § 2-302.
188. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) ("The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party
had fully performed •..•"); Sellers v. Frank Griffin AMC Jeep, Inc., 526 So. 2d 147, 150 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (interpreting UCC to provide "meaningful remedies" for car purchaser).
Remedy provisions should be interpreted to prevent harsh results. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Sharp, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 529 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ("[Section l-106's principles are] intended tonegate unduly narrow or technical interpretations."). Imposing liability on an innocent account
holder or bank for a loss proximately caused by the beneficiary's bank conflicts with this basic
tenet. The principle of loss-spreading also supports the policy of full compensation under the
Code. See Hull, supra note 179, at 614 (check fraud loss-allocation scheme policy seeks "best
risk-bearer," normally a large bank instead of a small customer).
189. See Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home Ctr., Inc., 188 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971) (rescission of sales contract); Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 382 A.2d 954, 956 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1978) (same).
190. See David M. Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L.J. 228 (1982); see
also Hull, supra note 179, at 635 (check-loss allocation under the Code based on negligence
standards). For a detailed explanation of Phillips' "culpability scale" and its application to funds
transfer liability, see infra text accompanying notes 226-31, 234, 237-42.
191. See, e.g., Arrow Indus. v. Zions First Natl. Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 1988) (duty
of all banks to exercise ordinary care); cf. T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 443 N.E.2d
932, 939 (N.Y. 1982) (good faith and reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing support
reasonableness duty in article 2).
192. See Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1235 (D.N.J. 1979)
(policy of deterring negligent drawers behind articles 3 and 4); cf. Summers, supra note 110, at
925 (Code meant to prescribe conduct).
193. See Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank - Houston, 790 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir.
1986) (wire transfer; party with personal contact with fraudulent beneficiary held liable); see also
Girard, 414 F. Supp. at 1242 (court should impose liability on party that took from forger);
White v. Hancock Bank, 477 So. 2d 265, 272 (Miss. 1985) (same); cf. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v.
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Article 4A itself reflects distinct policy aims for the EFf system.
A primary purpose of the new article is to make the law of EFfs uniform and consistent. 194 Because a wire transfer is a unique form of
payment, 4A's particular allocation rules are needed to create a distinct and certain liability framework. 195 4A should promote the
processing of funds transfers at a low cost and high speed, 196 for the
desire for economy presumably led to the creation of wire transfers.
Implicitly, 4A also should encourage the advancement of wire transfer
technology.
But the multiplicity of policies indicates that no single UCC policy
controls. As the Code furthers potentially divergent purposes - such
as fairness and liability based on fault on the one hand and certainty,
speed, and uniformity on the other - conflicting principles will pose
problems for a court. Courts must strike a balance, perhaps sacrificing
certainty of the rules in favor of fault allocation. 197 Even the Code
recognizes that, in some cases, certainty should succumb to faimess. 198
Were negligence liability clearly contrary to UCC policy, imposing it
would probably be improper. 199 But the Code - even in 4A - both
employs and rejects negligence principles; in such a case, an individual
UCC policy alone should not be dispositive, though it may inform the
analysis.
Article 4A's particular policy goals similarly rest on an uncertain
foundation. The new article resulted from compromise,200 and as a
result the force behind any one policy is doubtful. As a product of the
groups most interested in the process,201 the UCC in its primary form
and as enacted by the states might be suspect as special interest legislation.202 A more basic objection to the certainty of 4A's policies is that
American Sav. & Loan Assn., 804 F.2d 1487, 1498 (9th Cir. 1986) (transferee from drawer in
better position to know of drawer's insolvency and will bear liability under warranty theory).
194. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 400.
195. Ballen & Diana, supra note 83, at 1399; Koh, supra note 55, at 109. But see supra
section I.B (arguing that the differences between wire transfers and other payment mechanisms
do not justify disparate treatment and that negligence liability should apply to both in some
cases).
196. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 400; see French, supra note 15, at 1426 ("A
central problem confronting the drafters of Article 4A was how •.. not [to] unduly disrupt the
quick, efficient handling of funds transfers.").
197. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 51, 11 1.06[2][a] (suggesting that, in bank payment
cases, tort principles are more applicable and may overcome policies of certainty and predictability); Hull, supra note 179, at 635.
198. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-402 cmt. 2 (beneficiary's bank's liability for wrongful failure to pay
beneficiary).
199. See Hillman, supra note 130, at 683; see supra section 11.B (relevant for displacement
inquiry); cf. Hull, supra note 179, at 616 (negligence liability in check fraud cases).
200. A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 4, at 401.
201. See id. at 400-01 ("constituent groups" included banks, the Federal Reserve System,
and corporations).
202. Cf. Hull, supra note 179, at 611 (stating that article 4's favorable treatment of banks
raises suspicion).
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the article only allocates loss explicitly where fault exists on the sending end of the transfer203 and may not apply where only the beneficiary's bank is at fault. Demands for speed and certainty less strongly
contradict the argument for liability based on relative fault where
these Code policies have little relevance. Liability for a negligent beneficiary's bank therefore may survive objections based upon 4A's
purposes.
Furthermore, the desired low-cost wire transfer might be unrealistic; when compared with other payment systems, wire transfers are
fairly expensive. 204 The prospect of loss alone makes the funds transfer process inherently costly, and as the risk grows with the volume of
wire transfers, 205 so will the real cost. Considering the enormous
amounts typically transferred, 206 a slightly higher price for an increased duty of care seems insubstantial. The value of a higher cost reduced losses - undercuts the policy favoring inexpensiveness of the
wire transfer per se.
The goal of liability certainty most forcefully rebuts the claim for
common law negligence liability. Article 4A's current system softens
this objection to a limited extent. The incorporation of liability rules
from other systems207 might place liability on a party different from
that under 4A. 208 Uncertainty is thus inherent in 4A itself, contrary
to the article's supposed bright-line rules.
2.

The Interaction Between Negligence and UCC Policies

Against this uncertain, multifaceted policy framework common
law negligence must survive displacement. Any common law theory
incorporated into the UCC should comport with Code policies or at
least minimize harm to them. If so, the extra-Code cause of action
likely remains. This section therefore examines common law negligence in light of the UCC's many divergent purposes and concludes
that negligence should remain a cause of action.
Negligence principles do not conflict prohibitively with either general UCC or special article 4A policies. The certainty and uniformity
203. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
204. See Geva, supra note 78, at 188 n.9 (arguing that absolutely, wire transfers are costlier:
"The alleged 'low cost' feature of the wire payment •.• is in relation to the amount of the average
wire payment and not as compared to other payment systems."). But see J. Kevin French, Arif·
c/e 4A '.S" Treatment of Fraudulent Payment Orders - The Customer'.S" Perspective, 42 ALA. L.
REv. 773, 781 (1991) (arguing that absolute prices rise little as the transfer's amount does, but
not directly addressing absolute price concerns).
205. French, supra note 204, at 775.
206. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
207. Section 4A-501 incorporates rules outside 4A, despite any inconsistency. U.C.C. § 4A501; see supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
208. Each automated clearinghouse observes its own rules system. See BAKER & BRANDEL,
supra note 103, ~ 19.02.
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that both section 1-102 and article 4A itself seek suffer from a duty
such as reasonableness, 209 but the magnitude of the resultant uncertainty and its harm can be mitigated. 210 General common law principles of reasonable care, article 3 and 4 reasonableness standards, and
guidelines already extractable from previous cases should provide
standards of conduct. The banking industry's behavior toward suspicious transfers may provide a valuable and feasible guide. 211 A common argument for certainty looks to the ease with which the parties
will be able to price their transaction. 212 If the parties know definitely
that one of them will bear the loss, they can determine their potential
costs and how much to charge as a bank or pay as a customer. But
even if certainty does simplify pricing, the price may not efficiently
allocate loss. 213
Further, any expectation of uniformity under 4A is unrealistic.
Judges seeking to avoid placing the loss on an innocent party may do
more covert violence to predictability and uniformity214 than would
the familiar law of negligence. Even in cases under the UCC, circuits
and states disagree as to its meaning and application. 215 States often
incorporate variations into the UCC when enacting it,216 and so article
4A ultimately may not represent uniform law. Because lawyers already examine the Code and case law of any jurisdiction involved in a
transaction, the threat of unfair surprise is mitigated.
Facilitation of speedy transactions, one of 4A's primary concerns,
would suffer if courts imposed negligence liability. With a limited burden on the beneficiary's bank, 217 however, the only impediments to
result will be the cost-effective ones. A bank need inquire only when
209. See Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank - Houston, 790 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir.
1986) (court, prior to 4A, held that commercial situations require more certainty than in traditional tort cases); cf. Hull, supra note 179, at 613 (common law che<::k fraud liability "undercut[s]" certainty policy).
210. Cf. Hull, supra note 179, at 614 (certainty in checking rules not unduly harmed).
211. See Phillips, supra note 190, at 276 ("[I]mprecision is tolerable considering the number
of similarly situated commercial actors whose existence and conduct provide good evidence to
establish the standard of conduct that would satisfy the negligence principle."); cf. Kugler v.
Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 651-52 (N.J. 1971) (overruling objections to vagueness of UCC unconscionability principles); Hull, supra note 179, at 617 (certainty in checking cases derived from
courts' application of common law negligence).
212. See, e.g., Bradford Trust, 190 F.2d at 409.
213. Efficiency requires the party that can most easily prevent the loss to bear it, resulting in
the least cost to society. See Thevenoz, supra note 17, at 901; White, supra note 66, at 616; see
also infra section 111.B.
214. See Summers, supra note 110, at 943.
215. Compare, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (rejecting the applicability of article 4 to wire transfers) with Bradford
Trust, 190 F.2d at 409 (accepting applicability).
216. For examples of the many variations that may arise, see generally [State UCC Variations] u.c.c. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan 1991); 1-3A UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) (West
1989 & Supp. 1991).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 37, 97-98; cf. Hull, supra note 179, at 621 (arguing

2604

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:2565

the circumstances of the transfer, the beneficiary's behavior, or the
character of the transfer suggests to a reasonable person that a theft is
underway. The assertion that any requirement for the beneficiary's
bank "would bring the wheels of commerce to a halt" 218 ignores the
history of wire transfers. Even under a regime of common law liability, including the possibility of a negligence claim, wire transfers proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s.2t9
Ironically, a negligence liability scheme furthers the modernization
of wire transfer systems and governing law. The Code's construction
favoring reasonableness should complement the realities of commerce,220 and negligence, in contrast to a rigid code, allows courts
flexibility to meet new situations.221 The common law can better respond to unforeseen problems, especially new forms of fraud. 222 Negligence liability and its ensuing allocation based on unreasonableness
provides incentive necessary to improve procedures and technologies,223 thereby advancing the EFr system indirectly. Also, a direct
negligence suit between the tortfeasor and the victim of its conduct
simplifies a given case by restricting the scope of litigation following a
fraud; a chain of multiple suits seeking the guilty party is avoided, 224
as is haggling between parties not directly responsible for the loss.
Thus the gain to the system at least partially offsets any increased cost
as a result of negligence liability., Further, nonquantifiable benefits of
negligence liability such as fairness 225 might even exceed any rise in
the overall cost of wire transfers, especially for the unwitting victims
of the fraud.
Indeed, in many ways Code policy already embraces negligence
principles by allocating loss based on fault. Professor Phillips has
demonstrated this recurring pattern of liability, including negligence
liability, in the UCC. 226 Under Phillips' "culpability scale," intentional harms or those committed knowingly in a given transaction will
that a requirement that a depositary bank in fraud cases authenticate the depositor is not substantial enough to justify refusal of liability).
218. Richards v. Platte Valley Bank, 866 F.2d 1576, 1583 (10th Cir. 1989) (bank need not
inquire into possible embezzlement by wire transfer without actual knowledge of the fraud).
219. See Wulff, supra note 3.
220. See, e.g., T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 443 N.E.2d 932, 937 (N.Y. 1982).
221. Phillips, supra note 190, at 277-78 ("In the absence of constant statutory revision .•• [,
a] negligence standard allows a change of legal requirements as the underlying practices in an
industry change." (emphasis added)); cf. U.C.C. § 4-103 cmt. I ("[I]t would be unwise to freeze
present methods of [check collection] by mandatory statutory rules.").
222. See Tallackson & Vallejo, supra note 83, at 665. Variation in some cases is desirable.
Cf. Hull, supra note 179, at 635, 642 (check-fraud liability).
223. Rainer Stockmann, Liability of Intermediary and Beneficiary Banks in Funds Transfer:
A Comparative Study ofAmerican and German Law, 8 INTL. TAX & Bus. LAW. 215, 257 (1990).
224. Cf. supra note 182.
225. See infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
226. Phillips, supra note 190.
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incur liability. 227 Ifno intentional harm is involved, then one who acts
with knowledge of the circumstances that should indicate a danger of
loss or "otherwise fail[s] to exercise due care" will be liable for his
negligent breach. 228 Last on the culpability scale, if no intentionally or
negligently acting parties are implicated, is the least-cost riskavoider229 (LCA) who represents the least culpable actor subject to
liability.
Consistent with notions of fault and responsibility, the parties on
the scale who act with a lower level of intent can shift liability
upwards if they prove another to have had a higher degree of awareness: from the LCA to the negligent actor, from the negligent actor to
the knowing actor, and on to the intentional actor. 230 Any higher
party will be liable to any lower party, if that lower party must pay the
victim. Examples of Phillips' culpability scale in the Code include article 2's title and warranty provisions, the forgery loss allocation of
articles 3 and 4, and holder-in-due course status.231 An employee's
forgery illustrates the liability hierarchy. The forging employee (the
intentional harmer) will always bear liability under section 3-416's
transfer warranty; next, if the bank that pays the forger fails to exercise ordinary care and contributes to the loss, the bank must pay "to
the extent the failure" led to the loss. 232 If the bank acts with due
care, then the employer will incur liability under section 3-405, on the
assumption that "the employer is in a far better position to avoid the
loss." 233 The employer is the least-cost risk-avoider and will suffer if
no other available party is more accountable. In the UCC, the intentionality of a party's behavior often determines liability. 234 A common
law negligence action would thus comport with the underlying Code
liability structure.
The rule of reasonableness suggests that the party most responsible
or at least the one able to avoid the loss at least expense should bear it,
and in several places the UCC adopts this sensible position. Though
some Code policies would suffer from a flexible allocation based on
fault, others would benefit from negligence liability; furthermore, the
227. Id. at 228.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 229.
230. Id. Yet 4A's provisions would deviate from this scheme by releasing the beneficiary's
bank, unless it is neither the LCA nor the negligent party. As section III.B argues, infra, even if
the negligent bank is not the LCA, it should still be liable under the scale; ifit is the LCA, then it
should only shift the loss if another party is more negligent.
231. Phillips, supra note 190, at 232-48.
232. u.c.c. § 3-405(b).
233. U.C.C. § 3-405 cmt. 1.
234. Phillips, supra note 190, at 228-29, 234, 289 (describing culpability scale); see Hull,
supra note 179, at 607 (in check liability cases, an initial allocation is tempered by fault-based
liability); id. at 621, 628 (Code's purpose of avoiding loss served by culpability allocation).
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UCC already embraces negligence principles. This adhesion to lossallocation based on culpability, and a lack of cohesiveness in UCC
policy needed for displacement, supports negligence incorporation.
B.

The Totality of Policy: Who Should Bear the Loss?

Overarching loss-bearing policy - the determination of who
should bear the loss in a given case - derives from both the UCC and
considerations outside the Code. Code guidance and non-Code social
considerations, such as loss-avoidance efficiency and fairness, exist simultaneously. The two generally coincide,235 but any inconsistency
requires a choice between upholding only the apposite Code principles
or satisfying societal expectations. In the case of a negligent beneficiary's bank in a wire transfer, both the UCC's culpability policy and
overall social concerns support liability.
The Uniform Commercial Code often places a loss on the LCA,
the party "who, by hypothesis, could most cheaply have avoided" the
result. 236 Following Phillips' culpability scheme, the LCA is strictly
liable for loss237 as the party that occupies the liability default position.
If the LCA is not the negligent party, it can shift the loss to a negligent
actor. 238 Article 4A, however, fails to uphold the UCC's culpability
scale completely. Negligence tempers strict liability in several places
in article 4A; the customer's ability to attach liability for the failure to
implement a reasonable security procedure and the failure to reasonably examine bank reports that absolve a bank from strict liability on
an erroneous payment order provide examples. 23 9 But article 4A, by
releasing the negligent beneficiary's bank, departs from the pattern
otherwise upheld throughout the Code. To impose liability consistent
with the Code's overall principles, a court should determine liability
235. See Phillips, supra note 190, at 252-53 ("[M]ost people would agree that the culpability
scale reflects their own assessment of the relative .•. blameworthiness .•• and further, would
place responsibility for loss on the party with greater culpability.").
236. Id. at 229; the definition of LCA is from White, supra note 66, at 623.
237. See Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank - Houston, 790 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir.
1986) (bank that dealt with thief and honored facially flawed payment order was "in the best
position to avoid the loss" and is held liable); New Jersey Bank, N.A. v. Bradford Sec. Operations, 690 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Recognizing a remedy in tort furthers [the UCC policy
of] •.. placing the risk of loss on the party most able to minimize that risk.").
238. Phillips, supra note 190, at 229. Some commentators have suggested an allocation based
on the ability to spread the loss from wire transfer error. E.g., Herbert F. Ling], Comment, Risk
A/location in International Interbank Electronic Fund Transfers: CHIPS & SWIFT, 22 HARV.
INTL. L.J. 621, 632 (1981); cf Stockmann, supra note 223, at 260-61 (discussing German law,
which apportions loss to limit the harshness of liability). But strict liability, without regard for
loss-avoidance or negligence, is problematic. Seeking the "deep pocket," an artificial imposition
of fault, violates notions of fairness, see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 51, at 692 (a bank
should bear the loss because of its ability to prevent it, not because of its wealth), and also may
result in an inefficient allocation of loss, see infra text accompanying notes 252-58.
239. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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based on culpability and LCA status.240 This inquiry resembles the
Hand formula, 241 but under the culpability scale Phillips describes, the
LCA need make a lesser inquiry and would only incur liability based
on facts it could reasonably know. 242 Under these standards, the beneficiary's bank should suffer liability if it could have most easily avoided
the loss or through its negligence allowed the fraud, 243 and no other
accessible party is more culpable. 244
In the hypothetical cases presented in this Note, the beneficiary's
bank should bear the loss as both the LCA and the negligent party. It
could most cheaply avoid the harm245 with an inexpensive duty to
confirm the accuracy of the order. 246 Where the originator and originator's bank are both innocent, for example, no amount of prevention
could have impeded the loss; 247 the beneficiary's bank, on the other
hand, might reasonably have stopped the theft with a quick call-back,
compliance with federal rules, or an inquiry into the beneficiary's identity. Computer programs or occasional audits by the beneficiary's
bank would also minimize name-number fraud at a much lower. cost
when compared with the security needed on the sending end of the
transaction.
No Code section, however, explicitly allocates liability to the
LCA, 248 and thus common law negligence provides the only method
for recovery in agreement with Code principles. For under this
scheme, even if the purported sender-account holder or the originator's bank could have avoided the loss at much greater cost,249 either
240. See White, supra note 66, at 623 (LCA's liability would reduce losses and promote
uniformity). Ability to avoid the loss has supported a beneficiary's bank's liability. See, e.g.,
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
241. White, supra note 61, at 616. The Hand formula, from United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), requires that the cost of prevention outweigh the potential
loss reduced by its probability of occurrence for a party to avoid negligence liability.
242. Phillips, supra note 190, at 229; see also id., at 254 (disregard of "considerations that
others acting reasonably would have entertained").
243. See, e.g., Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. First Am. Bank & Trust, 731 F. Supp.
57, 64 (D. Mass. 1990) (bank could have prevented wire transfer loss through the exercise of
reasonable care); Central Coordinates, Inc. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 494 N.Y.S.2d 602, 605
(Sup. Ct. 1985); cf. New Jersey Bank, N.A. v. Bradford Sec. Operations, 690 F.2d 339, 347 (3d
Cir. 1982) (loss from forged check placed on LCA, the negligent depositary bank); HILLMAN ET
AL., supra note 51, ~ 14.07[1][b] (citing check cases holding negligent LCA liable).
244. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
245. See Ling!, supra note 238, at 658 (The party " 'in possession' of the message ... is
usually the •.• best cost-avoider."). Requiring the originator or its bank to erect a foolproof
system would impose considerable expense, see WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 5.3 (effective security
technology is costly), and a beneficiary's bank's responsibility for its own reasonable observations
would mitigate the need for state-of-the-art protection by the originator.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 35-37, 97-98.
247. See WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 1.3 (computer system vulnerability).
248. See White, supra note 66, at 623.
249. For higher-cost risk-avoiders, the security needed to prevent loss may prohibit them
from even considering wire transfers. Benner, supra note 5, at 248.
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party should still be allowed to shift the loss to the more culpable,
negligent beneficiary's bank.250 Because the reasonable observer
would likely conclude that the bank acted unreasonably in not making
even a minimal inquiry, especially considering the potential loss, liability should attach.251
Separate societal concerns also support a negligence action against
a beneficiary's bank in these cases, regardless of UCC considerations.
A fair allocation should result and loss-avoidance cost will settle at the
lowest level so that only efficient losses will result. First, because the
risk of loss increases with the level of an actor's unreasonableness, failure to hold a negligent actor liable increases the cost of loss prevention. 252 A negligent party can prevent the loss more easily because its
information costs are lower253 - having the ability to escape liability,
it must only reasonably observe the circumstances and need not gather
all information necessary to avoid loss absolutely. An account holderoriginator, by contrast, would bear much higher information costs in
monitoring both ends of the transaction. 254 Second, a party shielded
by reasonable care status will take preventive steps only when less expensive than compensation. 255 Third, the standard discourages losses
themselves, because a negligent beneficiary's bank shielded from liability by the reasonableness of its behavior is more likely to act to prevent
loss than is a strictly liable originator or originator's bank with no
possibility of escape. 256 Consequently, lower total loss results from a
due care standard, with fewer losses occurring and less cost to prevent
them. LCA liability achieves the most efficient result, 257 and because
the LCA here is also the negligent party, negligence liability lowers the
overall cost to society.25s
250. See Phillips, supra note 190, at 289 ("[The] Code's general pattern of loss·allocation
reflects ... [an] instrumental approach ••. [that seeks] risk reduction •.. [based on] culpability."); Koh, supra note 55, at 110 n.145 ("Guided by ordinary negligence principles, the sending
bank should invoke last clear chance to shift its loss.").
251. This Note assumes that negligence has arguably occurred. The issue is whether it may
be claimed at all. If not proved, however, the only basis for a beneficiary's bank's liability would
be as least-cost avoider - a basis absent from article 4A. See supra note 248 and accompanying
text.
252. See Phillips, supra note 190, at 260.
253. Id. at 259.
254. See Stockmann, supra note 223, at 264; cf. Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d
951, 958 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982) (placing the burden of collecting information on sending bank is inefficient).
255. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 92 (1972) (under a negligence
standard, a party will adopt precautions that cost less than its potential losses).
256. Phillips, supra note 190, at 259. If one party will almost certainly lose, it will have no
incentive to fight despite its innocence. See Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas Am. Bank - Houston,
790 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 1986); Scott, supra note 82, at 1712.
257. POSNER, supra note 255, at 70; Thevenoz, supra note 17, at 901.
258. Cf. POSNER, supra note 255, at 93-95 (although strict liability alone might result in
efficiency in some cases, its tempering through negligence principles is necessary most often to
achieve efficiency). Strict liability's ineffectiveness in lowering overall loss is especially evident in
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In addition, the costs of a due care standard should not exceed the
benefits gained from negligence liability instead of article 4A's strict
scheme. A reduction in losses caused by a higher duty of care under
negligence liability could outstrip the administrative costs associated
with negligence. Judicial animosity toward the unfairness of nonfault
allocation might increase litigation expense when courts object and
find liability in the absence of specific Code provisions.259 Litigation
between the customer and the originator's bank to avoid suffering
their faultless loss as in section I.A.1 might be just as expensive as a
negligence determination. 4A already requires reasonableness determinations for an evaluation of the security procedure260 and these
standards could illuminate the conduct expected of the beneficiary's
bank.
Negligence liability should also reduce social cost by fosterillg
more efficient pricing of EFTs. While strict liability imposed on the
originator or its bank would allow easier pricing,261 liability of the beneficiary's bank in these cases produces a more efficient mechanism because the beneficiary's bank can better gauge potential losses262 and
therefore can set charges high enough to compensate for its losses.
The cost for the LCA, however, is still lowest from society's viewpoint. Transfers will continue but prices should settle at the socially
efficient level:263 high enough to encourage a level of transfers at
which overall loss is minimized.
Finally, nonefficiency considerations favor the application of negligence liability. Judges, presented with innocent parties seeking compensation or with a beneficiary's bank's remorseless or unblinking
conduct, can escape the dilemma with which the arbitrary rules of 4A
would otherwise present them. 264 Negligence law provides the tool
both to meet the Code's general fault structure and to achieve a result
consistent with basic notions of fairness. The Code's tenor indicates
this Note's hypothetical cases, because loss prevention through strict liability assumes that the
liable party can affect the outcome. The only way here for the party apparently strictly liable
under 4A to influence the outcome, is to incur prohibitive cost. See supra text accompanying
notes 247, 249.
259. See Phillips, supra note 190, at 261-62; see also Ling!, supra note 238, at 660 (arguing
that strict liability determination facially costs less, but ignoring individual judicial actions to
escape strict liability allocation).
260. See U.C.C. § 4A-202(b).
261. See Patrikis et al., supra note 115, at 224 (arguing that certainty of strict liability indicates predictable costs and eliminates "false pricing strategies"); Tallackson & Vallejo, supra note
83, at 665 (same).
262. Thevenoz, supra note 17, at 900; Koh, supra note 55, at 112.
263. Koh, supra note 55, at 111 ("Generally, assigning liability to the cheapest cost avoider
will make wire transfers less expensive."); see supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
264. For an example of one court's reaction to a beneficiary's bank's obvious disregard for
harm, see Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (pre-4A),
modified, 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
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that such moral considerations influenced its drafters. 265 However,
tort liability, as opposed to a contractual scheme like 4A, reflects public policy concerns that deserve affirmation; incorporation of the common law facilitates society's input.266 An inquiry into the beneficiary's
bank's behavior allows conduct, and not mere status, to determine accountability267 - a concept imbedded, no doubt, in American law.
Extra-Code societal concerns thus provide additional support for a
negligence action against the beneficiary's bank.
CONCLUSION

The UCC is not perfect. Its static provisions cannot respond adequately to all situations, especially those that fall outside its terms or
at the perimeter of its logic. Section 1-103's explicit allowance for
common law remedies evidences this shortcoming. The common law
escape provision may alone properly resolve these hard cases, where
the UCC does not apply or where it demands objectionable results, in
a manner consistent with expectations of responsibility and efficiency.
Article 4A recognizes the need for occasional supplementation of
Code liability. 268 When a beneficiary's bank negligently pays a wire
transfer, an action against it should be allowed, because 4A fails to
resolve the problem adequately. Article 4A probably does not provide
a solution without causing conflict within the Code and with other
relevant rules. Even if contradiction is avoided, UCC liability anomalously falls on one of two innocent parties and a more guilty one escapes, causing inefficiency, unfairness, and, predictably, judicial
misgivings. The potential liability will not straitjacket the banking
system, for the duty of reasonable care will only arise in a small
number of cases and require limited actions comparable to those already mandated by federal law.
Without a Code provision imposing least-cost risk-avoider liability,
the common law of negligence facilitates the proper outcome by holding the lowest-cost avoider and guiltiest party responsible. Resort to
common law liability is therefore appropriate here; 4A's provisions do
not clearly displace it. The policies of the UCC militate both against
and in support of negligence, providing no insurmountable burden to
incorporation of due care concepts from outside the Code. Negligence
liability is actually consistent with its structure. Beyond the UCC's
265. Phillips, supra note 190, at 280-86. While 4A was drafted about forty years after the
UCC was originally created, respect for the Code's basic structure and for its past and more
recent drafters suggests that moral considerations retain their value.
266. Joseph G. McCarty, Note, U. CC Article 4A - Wire or Wire Not? Consequential Damages Under Article 4A and a Critical Analysis of Evra v. Swiss Bank, 11 COMPUTER L.J. 341, 363
(1991).
267. See Phillips, supra note 190, at 277.
268. U.C.C. § 4A-105(d): "[A]rticle 1 [which includes § 1-103] contains general ••• princi·
pies of construction and interpretation applicable throughout this article."
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limited view, independent social concerns support a negligence claim.
The Code is law, after all, and allowing a negligence suit against a
beneficiary's bank will not only efficiently allocate losses but also comport with instinctive concepts of justice.

